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**ANALYSIS OF THE EXECUTION OF COUNTER-DRUG STRATEGY IN
BOLIVIA USING THE LOW INTENSITY CONFLICT IMPERATIVES**

A thesis presented to the Faculty of the U.S. Army
Command and General Staff College in partial
fulfillment of the requirements for the
degree

MASTER OF MILITARY ART AND SCIENCE



by


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REPORT DOCUMENTATION PAGE			Form Approved OMB No. 0704-0188	
<small>Public reporting burden for this collection of information is estimated to average 1 hour per response, including the time for reviewing instructions, searching existing data sources, gathering and maintaining the data needed, and completing and reviewing the collection of information. Send comments regarding this burden estimate or any other aspect of this collection of information, including suggestions for reducing this burden, to Washington Headquarters Services, Directorate for Information Operations and Reports, 1215 Jefferson Davis Highway, Suite 1204, Arlington, VA 22202-4302, and to the Office of Management and Budget, Paperwork Reduction Project (0704-0188) Washington, DC 20503.</small>				
1. AGENCY USE ONLY (Leave blank)	2. REPORT DATE 5 June 1992	3. REPORT TYPE AND DATES COVERED Masters Thesis 1 Aug 91 - 5 June 92		
4. TITLE AND SUBTITLE Analysis of the Execution of Counter-Drug Strategy in Bolivia using the Low Intensity Conflict Imperatives			5. FUNDING NUMBERS	
6. AUTHOR(S) Major Sergio de la Pena, USA				
7. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) U.S. Army Command and General Staff College ATTN: ATZL-SWD-GD Fort Leavenworth, Kansas 66027-6900			8. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION REPORT NUMBER	
9. SPONSORING/MONITORING AGENCY NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES)			10. SPONSORING/MONITORING AGENCY REPORT NUMBER	
11. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES				
12a. DISTRIBUTION/AVAILABILITY STATEMENT Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited. Distribution authorized to U.S. Government agencies only. Proprietary information, 5 June 1992.			12b. DISTRIBUTION CODE	
13. ABSTRACT (Maximum 200 words) This study investigates the actions of U.S. military personnel conducting the counterdrug mission in Bolivia in accordance with the Bolivian/U.S. Counter-Drug Strategy. The analysis determines if U.S. personnel, in executing their mission, are complying with the low intensity conflict (LIC) imperatives. The study uses Operations "Blast Furnace" and "Snowcap" conducted in 1986 and 1989 respectively as illustrative examples to analyze the execution of the counter-drug mission. The LIC imperatives are the doctrinally approved "truths" acknowledged as essential to the successful planning and execution of LIC operations. The counter-drug mission is a subset of peacetime contingency operations; therefore, the analysis provides a validation of the imperatives as an analytical tool. The study concluded that U.S. personnel did not comply with the LIC imperatives. The failure to comply has a direct correlation to the failure to stop the flow of cocaine from Bolivia.				
14. SUBJECT TERMS Counter-Drug Strategy, Bolivia, Low Intensity Conflict (LIC) Imperatives, Operation Blast Furnace			15. NUMBER OF PAGES 110	
			16. PRICE CODE	
17. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF REPORT UNCLASSIFIED	18. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF THIS PAGE UNCLASSIFIED	19. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF ABSTRACT UNCLASSIFIED	20. LIMITATION OF ABSTRACT UNLIMITED	

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
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THESIS APPROVAL PAGE


Name of candidate: Major Sergio de la Peña

Title of thesis: Analysis of the Execution of Counter-Drug Strategy in Bolivia Using the Low Intensity Conflict Imperatives


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The opinions and conclusions expressed herein are those of the student author and do not necessarily represent the views of the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College or any other government agency. (Reference to this study should include the foregoing statement.)

ABSTRACT

ANALYSIS OF THE EXECUTION OF COUNTER-DRUG STRATEGY IN BOLIVIA USING THE LOW INTENSITY CONFLICT IMPERATIVES By MAJ Sergio de la Peña, USA, 115 pages.

This study investigates the actions of U.S. military personnel conducting the counter-drug mission in Bolivia in accordance with the Bolivian/U.S. Counter-Drug Strategy. The analysis determines if U.S. personnel, in executing their mission, are complying with the low intensity conflict (LIC) imperatives. These imperatives are (1) political dominance, (2) adaptability, (3) unity of effort, (4) legitimacy, and (5) perseverance. The study used Operations "Blast Furnace" and "Snowcap" conducted in 1986 and 1989 respectively as illustrative examples to analyze the execution of the counter-drug mission.

The LIC imperatives are the doctrinally approved "truths" acknowledged as essential to the successful planning and execution of LIC operations which are: insurgency-counterinsurgency, peacekeeping operations, combatting terrorism, and peacetime contingency operations. The counter-drug mission is a subset of peacetime contingency operations; therefore, the analysis provides a validation of the imperatives as an analytical tool.

The study concluded that U.S. personnel did not comply with the LIC imperatives. The failure to comply has a direct correlation to the failure to stop the flow of cocaine from Bolivia.

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ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

I thank the people who contributed to this study: LTC Wade Bowie who patiently provided timely corrections and suggestions to the thesis and accepted the responsibility of being committee chairman on a very late starting project, Mr. Roland Dutton who provided constant encouragement, and Dr. Graham Turbiville who added the academic focus and perspective to the paper.

I especially thank my wife who was introduced to army life on October 25, the day after the first comprehensive CGSC exam. She has spent the first and best year of our lives patiently proofreading and providing advice on the thesis. Her technical writing skills made a difficult job much easier. Without the assistance from family and friends, I could not have completed this thesis.

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CHAPTER ONE

INTRODUCTION

The purpose of this thesis is to determine if U.S. military personnel in Bolivia are employing the Low Intensity Conflict (LIC) imperatives set out in U.S. Army/Air Force joint doctrine in executing the Bolivia/U.S. Counter Drug Strategy objectives. The U.S. military is only one of several agencies involved in the counter-drug mission in Bolivia. The effort is headed locally by the U.S. Ambassador with the U.S. military in a supporting role. The counter-drug mission presents the military with a challenge that may require modification to some of the traditional military roles.

The 5 December 1990 Field Manual (FM) 100-20/Air Force Pamphlet (AFP) 3-20 Military Operations in Low Intensity Conflict (LIC) is the primer for U.S. Army/Air Force LIC doctrine. It identifies the following as imperatives: (1) political dominance, (2) adaptability, (3) unity of effort, (4) legitimacy, and (5) perseverance. Because the LIC imperatives are the doctrinally accepted foundation for the planning and execution in LIC, the study will use them as an analytical tool applied to the U.S. military's counter-drug role in Bolivia. The study does not intend to judge the effectiveness of the

counter-drug strategy nor advocate a position for or against the effort.

RESEARCH QUESTION

The research question addressed in this thesis is as follows:
Are U.S. military personnel in Bolivia employing the low intensity conflict (LIC) imperatives in executing the Bolivia/U.S. Counter Drug Strategy?

The following secondary questions will be based on the LIC imperatives and will be instrumental in answering the primary question:

- * Are U.S. military personnel complying with legitimacy both from a U.S. and a Bolivian point of view?
- * Do U.S. political objectives guide the actions of U.S. military personnel down to the tactical level?
- * Are they integrating their actions with the U.S. civilian and host country agencies to achieve unity of effort?
- * Are U.S. military planning their counter-drug effort for the long term?
- * Are U.S. military personnel adapting their methods of operations and organizational structure to accommodate changes in the execution of the strategy?

These questions will provide the basis for the thesis discussion.

BACKGROUND

This thesis is based on the interaction of four key variables. These are: the LIC imperatives, the Bolivia/U.S. Counter-Drug Strategy, U.S. personnel actions in support of counter-drug operations, and Bolivia's environment (political, economical, social, and coca).

The first variable will be the LIC imperatives which provide the doctrinal foundation for the study. This thesis will use them as a checklist by subdividing the definition into its component parts. Each part provides an additional consideration to review in the analysis. The LIC imperatives apply to all four LIC operational categories which are: (1) counterinsurgency/insurgency, (2) peacekeeping operations, (3) combatting terrorism, and (4) peacetime contingency operations. Doctrinally, counter-drug operations are a subset of peacetime contingency operations.

The study will also prioritize the importance of the LIC imperatives in two groups. The higher priority will be legitimacy and political dominance followed by unity of effort, perseverance, and adaptability. Legitimacy and political dominance are of the higher priority because they can determine the political power of a country. Failure to comply with these two imperatives will render a negative answer to the research question because they form the foundation to successful planning and execution in LIC. Unity of effort, perseverance, and adaptability deal with how well the government can perform its functions.

Legitimacy rests with the willing acceptance of the populace to be governed. Agreement between the populace and the government over the right to rule is critical to a country's harmony. Political dominance reflects on a government's ability to conduct business and achieve consensus. Before a government addresses unity of effort, perseverance and adaptability, it must have legitimacy and political dominance.

The second variable will be the Bolivia/U.S. Counter-Drug Strategy. It provides the U.S. Ambassador's guidance to the U.S. Country Team-Bolivia. The Strategy objective, as stated in the 1990 unclassified U.S. Military Group-Bolivia briefing was: "To restrict and ultimately eliminate the production of cocaine for export to the U.S. or other markets for domestic use." To obtain this objective, the Bolivian and U.S. military and civilian participants in the counter-drug effort must consider these four goals:

- (1) Development of autonomous Bolivian institutional capability to regulate licit and eliminate illicit coca cultivation and trade.
- (2) Enforcement of laws prohibiting production or trafficking in cocaine.
- (3) Investigation, apprehension, and imprisonment or extradition of major drug traffickers.
- (4) Development of Bolivian political will to use the institutional capabilities to attack production and export of cocaine.¹

The importance of the Strategy objective and goals is that they provide planning and execution guidance and a long term measure of

¹U.S. Military Group-Bolivia, Unclassified Country Briefing (La Paz, Bolivia: 1991), p. 18.

effectiveness. These objectives and goals represent the ultimate aims of the Bolivian and U.S. government and their subordinate agencies involved in the counter-drug effort.

The third variable will be the conduct of U.S. military personnel in two counter-drug support operations that will serve as illustrative examples of the execution of counter-drug strategy. These were Operations "Blast Furnace" and "Snowcap." Both were headed by the DEA with U.S. military providing logistical, technical, and intelligence support assistance. The U.S. military personnel provided specialized skill and equipment not readily available in the other civilian organizations involved in the counter-drug effort.

From July to November 1986, Operation "Blast Furnace" was conducted by Task Force Janus comprised of 170 personnel from the U.S. Southern Command (SOUTHCOM). Its mission was:

. . . to provide air transportation, at the direction of the U.S. Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) contingent. . . to Bolivian counter-drug police forces as they sought to destroy cocaine production laboratories. The U.S. ambassador retained overall responsibility for U.S. involvement in the operation.²

Operation "Snowcap," undertaken by the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) in March 1987, was a Latin American counter-drug campaign designed to reduce the flow of cocaine into the U.S. by 50% in three years. It involved personnel from the DEA, the State Department, the U.S. Coast Guard, the U.S. Border Patrol, the U.S.

²Abbott, "The Army and the Drug War: Politics or National Security?" Parameters vol. xviii no. 4, December 1988, p. 95.

military, and host country counter-drug forces. "Snowcap" targeted the destruction of clandestine air strips, coca processing labs, and drug trafficker operations.³ Because operation "Snowcap" was a complex and lengthy undertaking, the study will primarily address the San Ramon raid, one of the major actions within "Snowcap".

The 8 November 1989 San Ramon raid exemplified the culmination of a three month long, DEA lead, battalion-sized, joint and combined Bolivia/U.S. action. The majority of the military planners arrived in Bolivia approximately one week prior to the raid. San Ramon is a town in the northwest corner of Bolivia in the Beni department approximately 100 kilometers from the Brazilian border. The objective of the raid was to capture or destroy cocaine processing facilities reportedly around San Ramon, seize inventories of precursor chemicals and arms and the capture of a major Bolivian drug trafficker--"Yayo" Rodriguez.

The fourth variable will consider the area of operations, specifically, Bolivia. This Andean country was selected for the study for several practical reasons. Primarily, it was not afflicted with a serious insurgency problem that would have added further complexity to the analysis in this thesis. The element of insurgency has a myriad of complex factors. For example, the complexities of the insurgent connection are exemplified in the symbiotic relationship that exists between drug traffickers and the Shining Path (SL) *Sendero Luminoso* insurgents in Peru and the Army of National

³H.R. Rep. No. 416, 101st Cong., 2nd Sess., (1990), p. 16.

Liberation (ELN) *Ejercito de Liberacion Nacional* in Colombia.⁴ The burden of the insurgency in both of these countries adds complicating issues to the political, social, and economic arenas.

Also Bolivia is the second largest source of coca leaf in the world. A great deal of the cocaine entering the U.S. began with the illicit cultivation of Bolivian coca leaves. Thus, it has become a target area for the supply reduction aspect of the U.S. National Drug Control Strategy. According to the National Narcotics Intelligence Committee (1988 statistics), Bolivia was responsible for cultivating 30%, compared with Peru at 55%, and Colombia at 15%.

To put the thesis into perspective, background information on other areas that impact on the study will be provided. This includes a description of the drug threat, the nascent military involvement in the counter-drug mission, information on coca/cocaine, a description of the key counter-drug strategies, and a brief history of Operations "Blast Furnace" and "Snowcap."

The four variables will provide the basis for analyzing and resolving the research question. They will be the parameters that set the limitations of the study. The LIC imperatives will provide the standards to subjectively analyze the actions of U.S. personnel in Operations "Blast Furnace" and "Snowcap" given the guidance provided in the Bolivia/U.S. Counter-Drug Strategy in the environment of Bolivia.

⁴Hertling, "Narcoterrorism: The New Unconventional War," Military Review March 1990, p. 17.

The analytical portion of the thesis will discuss the interaction of the key variables. The first step of the analysis will identify the components of each LIC imperative. They will provide the doctrinal checklist for evaluating the counter-drug effort. Next, the thesis will analyze whether U.S. personnel's actions in Operations "Blast Furnace" and "Snowcap" complied with the LIC imperatives. The analysis will also consider the impact of the environment and the U.S. Country Team's guidance.

The final part of the thesis will draw conclusions from the analysis. The conclusion will provide an assessment as to whether U.S. military personnel employed the LIC imperatives in the execution of Bolivia/U.S. Counter-Drug Strategy in Bolivia and suggest some implications of the findings.

ASSUMPTIONS

The study will use the following assumptions:

- * The LIC imperatives are accepted as key doctrinal "truths" in the successful planning and execution of counter-drug strategy objectives.
- * The two operations are illustrative examples of the execution of Bolivia/U.S. Counter-Drug Strategy.

DEFINITION OF KEY TERMS

The key component of the study is the definition of the LIC imperatives which provide the doctrinal foundation for the analysis. The key definitions follow:

Adaptability: The skill and willingness to change or modify structures or methods to accommodate different situations. It requires careful mission analysis, comprehensive intelligence, and regional expertise. Adaptability is more than just tailoring or flexibility, both of which imply the use of the same technique or structure in many different situations. Successful military operations in LIC will require the armed forces to use adaptability not only to modify existing methods and structures, but to develop new ones appropriate to each situation. (FM 100-20/AFP 3-20)

Legitimacy: The willing acceptance of the right of the government to govern or of a group or agency to make and enforce decisions. Legitimacy is not tangible, nor easily quantifiable. Popular votes do not always confer or reflect legitimacy. It derives from the perception that the authority is genuine and effective and uses proper agencies for reasonable purposes. No group or force can create legitimacy for itself, but it can encourage and sustain legitimacy by its actions. Legitimacy is the central concern of all parties directly involved in a conflict. It is also important to other parties who may be involved even indirectly. (FM 100-20/AFP 3-20)

LIC Imperatives: These elements constitute the prerequisites for the successful prosecution of low intensity conflict. These include: political dominance, unity of effort, adaptability, legitimacy, and perseverance. (FM 100-20/AFP 3-20)

Perseverance: Low intensity conflicts rarely have a clear beginning or end marked by decisive actions culminating in victory. They are, by nature, protracted struggles. Even those short, sharp contingency encounters which do occur are better assessed in the context of their contribution to long-term objectives. Perseverance is the persistent pursuit of national goals and objectives for as long as necessary to achieve them. Perseverance does not preclude taking decisive action. However, it does require careful, informed analysis to select the right time and place for that action. While it is important to succeed, it is equally important to recognize that in the LIC environment success will generally not come easily or quickly. Developing an attitude of disciplined, focused perseverance will help commanders reject short-term successes in favor of actions which are designed to accomplish long-term goals. (FM 100-20/AFP 3-20)

Political Dominance: In LIC operations, political objectives drive military decisions at every level from the strategic to the tactical. All commanders and staff officers must understand these political objectives and the impact of military operations on them. They must adopt courses of action which legally support those objectives even if the courses of action appear to be unorthodox or outside what traditional doctrine had contemplated. (FM 100-20/AFP 3-20)

Unity of Effort: Military leaders must integrate their efforts with other governmental agencies to gain a mutual advantage in LIC. Military planners must consider how their actions contribute to initiatives which are also political, economic, and psychological in nature. Unity of effort calls for interagency integration and coordination to permit effective action within the framework of our governmental system. Commanders may answer to civilian chiefs or may themselves employ the resources of civilian agencies. (FM 100-20/AFP 3-20)

LIMITATIONS

The following limitations applied to the thesis:

- * The study is based on unclassified information. Since much of the counter-drug mission is classified, this limits the sources and details of the information.
- * The thesis will analyze a dynamic process that is constantly evolving. The findings will be a snapshot in time of a process that may take decades to resolve. The U.S. military in the counter-drug mission in Bolivia is a relatively new phenomenon. The first U.S. military operation of significant size was "Blast Furnace" in 1986. It occurred shortly after President Reagan declared the "war on drugs."

DELIMITATION

The assessment of the U.S. military's actions is based on two operations in order to focus the analysis in this study.

SIGNIFICANCE OF THE STUDY

Answering the thesis question will provide insights on the U.S. military's drug interdiction mission in Bolivia. The study may identify areas that need improvement or perhaps a change in focus. For example, the principle of perseverance is based on a protracted effort, and the extent to which U.S. military planners are considering the implications of the length of time required to comply with this imperative is one of a number of key issues. Therefore, planners must consider the impact of their efforts over, possibly, several years. The study may also validate the use of the LIC imperatives as doctrinally accepted analytical tools.

CHAPTER TWO

RESEARCH METHODOLOGY

The research methodology for the study was based on four key variables. The first of these were the LIC imperatives delineated in FM 100-20/AFP 3-20. The definition of each of the imperative was subdivided to its components to provide a checklist was the foundation for the study. It was used to determine compliance and provide the essence of the analysis of the other three variables.

The second variable was the Bolivia/U.S. Counter-Drug Strategy objective. It address the interdiction of illicit drugs. The study used the Strategy as stated in the unclassified U.S. Military Group (USMILGP). The Strategy objective was almost a verbatim reflection of some of the objectives of the February 1991 Cartagena Summit and the Southern Command (SOUTHCOM) Counter-Drug Strategy.

The third variable was Bolivia which included its history, people, politics, economy, and coca. The background information was primarily based on Spanish history book and an area handbook series on Bolivia. Some the recent history (after 1990) was provided by newspaper and magazine articles.

The fourth variables were the actions of military personnel in Operations "Blast Furnace" and "Snowcap". Military action from

Operation "Snowcap" dealt primarily with the San Ramon raid. The sources for the information were congressional reports for both operations. Two after action reports and a magazine article from personnel directly involved with "Blast Furnace" provided additional information. The majority of the information on the San Ramon raid was presented in two hour television interview with Don Ferrone, the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) chief in Bolivia.

"Blast Furnace" was selected because it was unprecedented in the size of the U.S. military combat element used for a counter-drug mission.⁵ It also provided a "snapshot" in time that involved a wide variety of military functions for analysis. Operation "Snowcap," as a whole, is too complicated to properly analyze in this study. To analyze "Snowcap," the study will focus the San Ramon raid which involved a coordinated, battalion-sized, joint and combined, military and civilian effort by both U.S. and Bolivian forces. The raid provided a more manageable case study that fit the constraints of the study.

The criteria for an affirmative answer to the thesis question required compliance with political dominance and legitimacy and with any two of the three remaining imperatives. These are unity of effort, perseverance, and adaptability. Political dominance and legitimacy have the greatest impact on national government agencies that have the responsibility for establishing and coordinating the counter-drug effort at the national and strategic levels. The other

⁵Abbott, p. 95.

three are less critical, but also important to success. For this reason, the criteria can only allow non-compliance with one of the lesser priority imperatives.

The component statements of the doctrinal checklist are also prioritized. These components are either critical or recommended. The critical component statements are essential to achieve compliance with the individual imperative; compliance with the recommended components is not. Political dominance and legitimacy have three and two components to their definition respectively. All five components are critical. The two components of adaptability are both also critical. Unity of effort has three components. The third component requires commanders to answer to civilian chiefs and may themselves use resources of civilian agencies is recommended; the first two components are critical. Perseverance also has three components; second is recommended. It states that perseverance does not preclude taking decisive action. The first and third are critical. The component statements of each of the LIC imperatives precedes the compliance/analysis portion of Operations "Blast Furnace" and "Snowcap" in Chapter Four.

The analysis considered the interaction between the U.S. and Bolivian civilian and military agencies and personnel that are principle players in the LIC environment. As indicated in the LIC imperatives, the U.S. military must consider the dynamics of these relationships with host country personnel and their impacts on combined objectives. The review for compliance with the LIC imperatives against the other three key variables provided the raw

data for the analysis. The conclusion presented an evaluation of the raw data taking into consideration the prioritization of the LIC imperatives. The conclusion also answered the thesis question.

CHAPTER THREE

BACKGROUND

THREAT

The greatest single threat to the stability of American society is drugs. The effects of drugs are increasing crime rates, damaging the nation's economy and health, and straining vital relations with international allies. Felony drug convictions account for the single largest and fastest growing segment of the federal prison population. At the end of December 1991, three major U.S. cities reported record homicide rates. The increased violence was attributed to drugs. Over 200,000 babies are born each year to mothers who use drugs. Approximately \$150 billion goes to drug dealers and an additional \$60 to \$80 billion are lost through absenteeism, inefficiency, embezzlement, nonproductivity, and medical expenses.⁶ In the international arena, the governments of nascent democracies are being undermined by corrupt government officials and drug

⁶Muri D. Munger and William W. Mendel, Campaign Planning and the Drug War (Carlisle, PA: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1991), p. 2.

traffickers. To attack the drug problem, federal funds for Fiscal Year (FY) 91 was \$10.5 billion compared with 1.2 billion in FY 1981.⁷

The National Institute on Drug Abuse's (NIDA) National Household Survey on Drug Abuse tracks drug use in several categories (e.g., lifetime use, past year use, and past month use). The 1990 Household survey indicates that occasional cocaine use is down from 5.8 million in 1988 to 4.1 million in 1990. Frequent cocaine use is also down from 862,000 to 662,000 in 1990.⁸ Though there seems to be a trend in the right direction, drug seizures are consistently breaking records and drug related crime is still on the rise.

INCREASED MILITARY INVOLVEMENT

The first major use of military personnel in a counter-drug effort was Operation "Blast Furnace." It will be covered in greater detail toward the end of this chapter. Earlier, U.S. military support to counter-drug operations had been limited to two U.S. Air Force and two U.S. Army helicopters to support DEA efforts in the Bahamas.⁹ Their support, however, was not a part of a national strategy and characterized the limited U.S. military involvement.

⁷Office of National Drug Control Policy, Executive Office of the President, (National Drug Control Strategy (Washington: Government Printing Office, February 1991), p. 135.

⁸Ibid., p. 5.

⁹Abbott, p. 101.

Given the serious nature of the drug threat and the realization that drugs posed a threat to national security, the President introduced the first in a series of yearly National Drug Control Strategies on 5 September 1989 in compliance with the Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1988. The strategy established quantified two and ten year objectives to reduce drug use in the United States. It established the basis for an attack on both supply and demand and addressed specific priorities to the criminal justice system, drug treatment, education, community action, the workplace, international initiatives, interdiction efforts, a research agenda, and an intelligence agenda.

On 18 September 1989, the Secretary of Defense issued guidance to the military to support drug law enforcement agencies (DLEA) in combatting the drug issue from the supply side. He also directed the Unified and Specified Commanders to prepare plans to detect and counter illicit drug entry into the United States. Secretary Cheney specifically directed Commander-in-Chief Southern Command (CINCSOUTH) to prepare a plan in conjunction with cooperating host countries to attack the production and trafficking of illegal drugs.

The CINCSOUTH's area of responsibility (AOR) is immense; it includes all Latin America minus Mexico and the Caribbean Basin. South America alone includes one sixth of the earth's land mass. The assets are few relative to the area. Security assistance funds to the countries in the SOUTHCOM AOR were roughly 10% of the total

program in FY 91.¹⁰ The low amount of security assistance money directed against the drug threat will impact of the ability of the U.S. military to implement its strategy in Bolivia.

Prior to the Secretary Cheney's guidance to CINCSOUTH on 18 September 1989 directing a more active support role in the counter drug effort, the primary focus had been on monitoring Nicaragua, support to Honduras, and to the El Salvadoran Army. In December 1989 the focus shifted to Operation "Just Cause" though the counter drug mission remained a priority.¹¹ After "Just Cause" the counter-drug effort in the Andean Ridge countries became the top priority. These countries have recently become the focus of increased U.S. drug interdiction efforts aimed at production and distribution. CINCSOUTH, per Secretary of Defense Cheney's guidance, has the mission of providing support to the host countries through the U.S. Country Teams. (Figure 3-1)

¹⁰Department of State, Congressional Presentation for Security Assistance: Fiscal Year 1991 (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1991), pp. 292,293.

¹¹Discussion with SOUTHCOM J-3 personnel, April 1991.

COUNTRY TEAM - BOLIVIA




Figure 3-1 Country Team Composition
(Source: SOUTHCOM Counternarcotics Briefing, 1991)

BOLIVIA: History

Bolivia is located in central South America. It is landlocked and has borders with Peru to the northwest, Brazil to the east, Argentina to the south, Paraguay to southeast and Chile to the southwest. Its capital city, La Paz, is the highest capital in the world at an altitude of 12,500 feet above sea level.

The earliest inhabitants of Bolivia were the Collas who arrived on the South American continent somewhere between 10,000 and 15,000 years ago. The Collas were an advanced civilization not unlike the Incas. They spoke Aymara which is still spoken by the Indians of the high plains or the *Altiplano*.

The Incas, who dominated the region in the 13th century, originally inhabited Lake Titicaca near La Paz. Between 1438 and 1532, the Inca empire flourished and extended from southern Colombia to central Chile. In 1531, a party of 180 men and 27 horses led by Francisco Pizarro landed at the Bay of Tumbez (northern Peru). In 1532, Pizarro conquered Atahualpa, the Inca king. By the mid-1500's, the Spaniards controlled the former Inca empire.

In 1545, an Indian servant discovered silver in Potosi, Bolivia (then called Alto Peru). It was the richest source of silver that history has known. The discovery brought tremendous wealth to the Spanish who used it to maintain its empire in Europe. Through its immense wealth, Potosi became the largest city in the western hemisphere with a population of 150,000. To extract the wealth from the silver mines the Spaniards conscripted Indian labor that

theoretically included adult males from 18-50 years of age.

Indian revolts continued throughout the 300 years of Spanish domination. Between 1771-1781, Indian rebellions extended from Cuzco, Peru to Tucuman, Argentina. The revolts were unsuccessful and the Spaniards regained control. As Spain lost to Napoleon in Europe, however, the colonies began another attempt for independence.

In 1809, Upper Peru was the first South American country to declare its independence and the last to achieve it on 6 August 1825. In 1825, Simon Bolivar defeated the last remnants of royalist (Spanish) forces. Bolivar became the first president and Upper Peru changed names to Bolivia in his honor. Between 1825 and 1829 Bolivia had four presidents and a great deal of political instability. From 1829-1839, Bolivia had its longest presidency under Marshall Andres de Santa Cruz who became the protector (dictator) of the Peru-Bolivian Confederation. It included three states: North Peru, South Peru, and Bolivia. During his tenure, Santa Cruz established the country's administrative and judicial infrastructure. Disputes over boundaries, autonomy and power destroyed the Confederation and Santa Cruz was exiled to France.

Political instability became the norm after the Santa Ana dictatorship. Between 1825 and 1992, Bolivia has had nearly 200 coups. During this period, 113 years were under military rule and 54 under civilian. Some heads of state served only a few days; ten were assassinated. Bolivia's political environment has been a major factor in its underdevelopment.

Territorial disputes also plagued Bolivia. After the South American countries formed, interpretation of the former Spanish boundaries became a source of conflict especially when mineral riches were involved. In 1879, Bolivia and Peru went to war with Chile over Bolivian claims to the phosphate and guano producing Atacama region along the Pacific coast. Bolivia lost her outlet to the sea which, even today, continues to be a source of political conflict between Bolivia and Chile. Peru finished the war in defeat with the loss of two of her southern most departments. One of these Chile returned in 1929.

Bolivia's territorial misfortunes continued. In 1900, the department of Acre in northwestern Bolivia sought to secede with the support of Brazil. The region was known for its vast potential wealth in rubber trees. After three years of conflict, Bolivia signed a the Treaty of Petropolis which ceded Acre to Brazil. Bolivia received 2,000,000 pounds sterling in compensation, but lost her outlet to the Atlantic via the Madeira River (a major tributary to the Amazon).

The final loss of Bolivian territory came during the Chaco War from 1932-1935. The Chaco region in southeastern Bolivia is a sparsely populated, arid desert. Its significance was its oil reserves. Bolivia, in its interpretation of national boundaries, claimed the region. Paraguay disagreed with Bolivia's claim, and the Chaco war ensued. Bolivia lost approximately 60,000 soldiers and an outlet to the Atlantic Ocean via the Paraguay River.

Bolivia's original size was 2,343,769 square kilometers. She lost 120,000 to Chile, 191,000 to Brazil, and 215,546 to Paraguay

through military conflicts. An additional 720,738 square kilometers were lost to diplomatic defeats. Today Bolivia has area of 1,096,485.¹²

At the end of the Chaco War, Bolivia was in a state of bankruptcy. The defeat was blamed on poor leadership and the interest of major companies who sought to gain monetarily at the expense of the soldiers who fought the war. Most of the soldiers were illiterate Indian conscripts who did not even speak Spanish.

Some of the junior leaders of the Chaco war saw a need for change. They formed the military order Country's Reason (RADEPA) *Razon de Patria*. It formed a coalition with the National Revolutionary Movement (MNR) *Movimiento Nacionalista Revolucionario*. In 1943, Major Guadalberto Villaroel ascended to the presidency. He instituted various programs for social reform that gave more rights to the Indians and workers including labor unions. Villaroel ran into extreme opposition from the left who accused him of being a Nazi and siding with tin mining industry. After surviving an attempted coup, his police forces executed several prominent political figures. In 1946, Villaroel and several of his colleagues were assaulted by a mob. Their bodies were hanged on lampposts adjacent to Burned Palace *Palacio Quemado*, the presidential office building.

In 1951, Victor Paz Estenssoro, who had been living in exile in Argentina since 1946, won the national elections as the MNR

¹²Mariano Baptista Gumucio, Historia Grafica de Bolivia (La Paz: Comision Episcopal de Educacion, 1981) pp. 277.

candidate. The incumbent president refused to allow Paz Estenssoro to assume power and relinquished the presidency to a military *junta* that was subsequently overthrown by a popular uprising with the support of army and police elements in 1952. Paz Estenssoro initiated the greatest political reforms in this century. These changes included: the nationalization of the tin mines, universal suffrage (which had previously been limited to literate adults), and land distribution to the Indians, increased educational opportunities to the masses, an emphasis on road construction and improvements in agricultural and petroleum production.

On 31 October 1952, the government nationalized the three major tin mines in the country and allowed the formation of the Mining Corporation of Bolivia (COMIBOL) *Corporacion Minera de Bolivia*.

The government allowed the miners greater political powers because they formed the militias that kept the military right wing elements in check. The miners then formed the Bolivian Labor Federation (COB) *Central Obrera Boliviana* to insure worker's benefits and participation in the political process. The COB was able to arrange semi-sovereign control over Bolivian Workers. Between 1952-1964, the MNR dominated Bolivian politics.

Paz Estenssoro had permitted the army to rebuild as a deterrent to Cuban-backed Communist insurgencies. In 1963, Bolivia had more graduates from the U.S. Army's Special Warfare School at Fort Bragg, North Carolina than any other South American country. From 1962-63, 659 Bolivian military officers received training at the

U.S. Army School of the Americas. Between 1958 to 1964 U.S. military assistance increased from \$100,000 to \$3,200,000. In November 1964, Victor Paz Estenssoro, on his third four year term, was overthrown by his Vice President General Rene Barrientos Ortuno in a coup.

Barriento's supporters looked to him to reduce the social excesses before the economy collapsed; however, he met heavy opposition from the COB. In retaliation, Barrientos placed the COB under government control, attempted to disarm the miner militias and arrested the labor leadership. The result was a massacre of miners and their families in 1967. The government opposition continued its protest against the Barrientos government. The labor sector resented the Barrientos administration policy of providing favorable terms to U.S. investors. Further friction with the U.S. resulted when, after defecting to Cuba, it was announced that the Minister of the Interior has been an agent for the CIA.¹³

In October 1967, the Bolivian Army captured and executed Ernesto "Che" Guevara in southeastern Bolivia. While U.S. Army Special Forces advisors were instrumental in assisting the Bolivian Rangers with Che's capture, the Bolivian military resented the U.S. assistance.¹⁴ Barrientos died in a helicopter crash in April 1969 leaving the presidency under military control. Between 1969-1971,

¹³Area Handbook Series, Bolivia: A Country Study (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1991), p. 41.

¹⁴Ibid.

left and right wing military elements struggled to control the presidency.

After four presidents, Colonel (later General) Hugo Banzer Suarez assumed the presidency in August 1971 with the support of the MNR, sections of the army, and the right wing Socialist Falange Party (FS) *Falange Socialista* . Initially, the Banzer presidency enjoyed popular support as the economy grew as exports increased threefold between 1970-74. Despite economic growth, Banzer reverted to suppression of the traditional opposition from the left. In 1973, he lost political support from the MNR when he postponed elections until 1974. After an attempted coup, he further postponed the elections until at least 1980. The Carter Presidency began to urge for election and political reform and made assistance contingent on improvements in these areas. The political turmoil took its toll, and in 1978, Banzer was overthrown in a coup by the army chief of staff, General David Padilla Aranciba, who supported left wing interests.

Increased interest in Bolivia began in 1972, when the U.S. became increasingly concerned about controlling the cultivation of coca in Bolivia. The U.S. Agency for International Assistance (USAID) provided \$200,000 in public safety programs to assist the police organizations in addressing illicit drug cultivation and trafficking. In 1975, a program for crop eradication followed. The U.S. State Department sponsored another program to eliminate coca and sponsored a study to consider crop substitution in 1977. These drug

control programs came to an end in 1980 with the General Garcia Meza Presidency¹⁵.

Elections in 1979 proved inconclusive between the MNR candidate Victor Paz Estenssoro and Luis Siles Suazo from the National Revolutionary Movement of the Left (MNR-L) *Movimiento Nacionalista Revolucionario de Izquierda*. In July 1980, General Luis Garcia Meza took power through a coup reportedly financed by drug traffickers and supported by mercenaries recruited by Klaus Barbie, former Gestapo chief in Lyon, France during World War II. Between 1980-81 cocaine exports were reportedly \$850 million.¹⁶ Garcia Meza's repressive regime was, however, unable to maintain control. The U.S. government under President Carter condemned the military regime and cancelled all aid to Bolivia. The Garcia Meza government responded by expelling the U.S. Ambassador after he denounced the government for its ties to drug traffickers. Civil unrest and widespread strikes caused by worsening economic turmoil forced him and two additional military presidents between 1980-82 to resign. In September 1982, the military turned the government to the congress who elected Luis Siles Suazo, winner of the 1980 elections, as president for a four year term.

With the return to democracy the U.S. offered Bolivia \$130 million contingent on coca eradication efforts. In August 1983, Bolivia signed four agreements with the U.S. to reduce coca

¹⁵H.R. Rep. No. 416, p. 46.

¹⁶Bolivia: A Country Study p. 46.

cultivation to a prescribed amount for legal sale only in exchange for U.S. economic assistance. The agreement included increasing a police presence in the coca growing Chapare region. The Bolivians did not meet the targets, and the U.S. reduced the assistance funds between 1982-85; the amount of cocaine from Bolivia doubled.¹⁷

Siles Suazo was unable to meet the popular expectations of the return to democracy. By 1983, his entire cabinet quit in protest. Labor unrest led by the COB exacerbated the economic problems that plagued the country with hyperinflation. On June 1984, six kidnappers representing elements of the military and the police abducted Siles Suazo. Ten hours later he was released after the military command denounced the kidnapping. Two cabinet ministers and more than 100 plotters were arrested or implicated. Among the plotters were several high ranking military officials and members of the "Leopardos" including their commanding officer, Colonel German Linares. The abduction was suspected to have been supported by leading drug traffickers. Siles Suazo's release did not resolve Bolivia's economic woes. By the end of 1984, inflation was running at 20,000% annually. In March 1985, after rumors of a military coup, the COB threatened revolution as the only solution to the economic problems. The government appeased the COB leadership with a 300% increase in salaries. Siles Suazo eventually left office in July 1985, one year before his term expired.

¹⁷H.R. Rep. 416, p.46.

In the elections that followed, Hugo Banzer Suarez, the former dictator, representing the National Democratic Action party (ADN) *Accion Democratica Nacional* initially led in votes, but a coalition of center-left parties defeated him. In August 1985, Victor Paz Estenssoro once again won the presidency; he immediately addressed the inflation rate which reached 26,000% by the end of 1985. The Bolivian Labor Federation (COB) *Central Obrera Boliviana* reacted with an indefinite nation wide strike; Paz Estenssoro responded by declaring strikes illegal and declared a 90 day state of siege. Thousands of workers were arrested and their leaders exiled. The strike ended when union leaders agreed to negotiate with the government. The collapse of the tin market, Bolivia's primary export, brought an additional economic burden to the already weakened economy. The COB once again called for strikes in protest of the closing of the state-owned Mining Corporation of Bolivia (COMIBOL) *Corporacion Minera de Bolivia* mines. The government retaliated with another state of siege enforced by the army.

In July 1986, the United States sent a contingent of 170 military personnel to assist the Bolivian government in the eradication of illegal coca. This deployment was Operation "Blast Furnace." The COB and government opposition groups were quick to protest. They accused the president of subverting the constitution and Bolivia's national sovereignty. In November, the U.S. military force departed and turned the drug eradication efforts to the Bolivian government. Although the operation is believed to be responsible for driving down the price of the coca leaf and the

destruction of several labs, shortly after the U.S. departure, the price of coca leaves increased, and the coca labs went back to business as usual. Labor disputes and protests to Paz Estenssoro's austerity measures continued through the end of his presidency in May 1989.

In late 1986, the Bolivian government purged all personnel from the National Directorate for the Control of Dangerous Substances (DNCSP) *Direccion Nacional para el Control de Sustancias Peligrosas* and replaced them with members of the Police General Command amid charges of vast corruption. The newly organized National Council Against Unlawful Use and Illicit Trafficking of Drugs (CONALID) *Consejo Nacional Contra el Uso Indebido y Tarfico Illicito de Drogas* became an autonomous organization directly subordinate to the president. Its director was given cabinet level rank. The government also reorganized the "Leopardos" also known as the Rural Mobile Patrol Unit (UMOPAR) *Unidad Mobil de Patrullaje Rural*, a paramilitary unit trained and equipped to combat drugs. The UMOPAR leadership was turned over to the Special Forces for Anti-Drug Operations headed by Air Force General Humberto Palacios Medina.¹⁸

In February 1987, Bolivia signed an agreement with the U.S. to limit coca harvesting though eradication. The U.S. made \$100 million in financial aid conditional on Bolivia's drug eradication effort. In August, the eradication program went into effect. The program's initial target was to eliminate 1,800 hectares of coca within a year.

¹⁸Defense and Foreign Affairs Handbook. "Bolivia," 2 vols. (London: Europa Publications Ltd.), 1:2.

The program called for voluntary eradication. Those coca growers willing to participate were paid \$2000 per hectare. The Bolivians met the target within 10 months.

In 21 July 1988, a law was passed which made the cultivation of coca illegal in most of the country. The law divided Bolivia into three areas: traditional, transitional, and illegal. The traditional area located north of La Paz in Las Yungas permitted the cultivation of 12,000 hectares for traditional purposes. The transitional area, located in the Chapare region approximately 150 kilometers west of Cochabamba, was to reduce 5000 to 8000 hectares annually. The illegal area was anywhere else in the country. (Figure 3-2) Bolivia currently cultivates 54,000 hectares which produce 80,000 metric tons of coca leaf. The coca growers were given a one year grace period to register their crops for eradication and compensation. Those failing to register were vulnerable to involuntary eradication.¹⁹

The U.S. made further financial aid contingent on Bolivia's coca eradication efforts above the prescribed ceiling. The Bolivian government refused to totally eliminate coca since it has been a part of the culture for thousands of years. The U.S. program provided \$300 million in eradication and crop substitution over a three year period.

As government involvement increased, confrontations ensued between counter-drug forces and the campesinos growers. In 1987,

¹⁹H.R. Rep. 416, p. 48.

the campesinos seized a Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) outpost in the Chapare forcing the personnel to relocate at an UMOPAR base. In May 1988, thousands of campesinos converged on Cochabamba to protest the government's eradication program.




Figure 3-2 Coca Growing Regions

(Source: U.S. Military Group-Bolivia Unclassified Briefing, 1991)

The government finally offered concessions to disperse the crowds. Between 1986-88, the UMOPAR reportedly killed over a dozen campesinos.²⁰

In 1988, the SOUTHCOM sponsored "FUERZAS UNIDAS" exercises with Bolivia were cancelled because of protests from most of the political parties. They protested because they were not consulted about the previous year's exercise, and they felt the exercises were a violation of Bolivian sovereignty. In May 1990, the exercises were again cancelled because the campesino coca growers were planning a massive protest, and the safety of American military personnel could not be guaranteed.

Drug related corruption is a common topic in the Bolivian press. In July 1988, Roberto Suarez, one of Bolivia's leading drug traffickers was arrested. His arrest resulted in the airing of a videotape on national television that showed, two prominent ADN members, a Bolivian Navy captain, and Suarez present at a party hosted by the drug traffickers at a ranch in Santa Cruz. Suarez was also linked to the bombing of Secretary of State Shultz's motorcade in La Paz in August 1988. Secretary Shultz went to La Paz to demonstrate U.S. resolve in supporting the Bolivian government in fighting drugs.²¹

The UMOPAR has earned a reputation for corruption. In March 1988, the Deputy Minister of Defense dismissed 90% of the UMOPAR members including 12 middle to high ranking officers for links to

²⁰Bolivia: A Country Study, p. 265.

²¹Ibid., p. 257.

drug traffickers. A prominent La Paz newspaper reported that the UMOPAR was returning confiscated drugs to the drug traffickers.

Drug related corruption is also common in the military. In October 1988, the undersecretary of the Social Defense Secretariat stated that the commander of the Seventh Division in Cochabamba and four of his top officers were dishonorably discharged for protecting clandestine airstrips for the drug traffickers.²² The U.S. temporarily suspended assistance to the Bolivian navy until the navy commander at Puerto Villaroel was replaced. The commander had been charged with protecting trafficking operations in the Chapare region. A 1990 U.S. congressional report stated that the Bolivian Navy was using U.S. provided river craft as water taxis for a profit, and in some cases transporting drugs for the drug traffickers.

In April 1989, the U.S. and Bolivia began negotiations to replace DEA personnel training the "Leopardos" with U.S. Army personnel as a result of threats against DEA agents. The DEA agents remained in place, however; in June, they executed a joint Bolivian-U.S. military operation. In July, the U.S. offered Bolivia a forgiveness on its foreign debt to the U.S. if Bolivia agreed to allow the spraying of herbicide on the coca fields. Bolivia refused.

The U.S. government addressed the Bolivian's concern about targeting the coca grower through emphasis on eradication. Early in 1989, the Bolivian/U.S. Counter-Drug Strategy changed focus from raiding the small subsistence farmer plots to raids on the the

²²Ibid.

processing labs. The purpose of the change was to avoid the confrontations with the bottom and less important wrung of the cocaine processing ladder and instead, interdict the drug traffickers involved in processing and transport of the drugs. The policy aimed to separate the Chapare, the center of cultivation, from the Beni, the center of processing and transport. The new policy also focused on the confiscation of the drug traffickers' personnel assets and the destruction of their facilities.²³

The results of the interdiction efforts in Bolivia have met with minimal success. A congressional committee assessed the following results:

...Bolivia is the world's second largest manufacturer of cocaine with the capability of annually producing 261 metric tons of cocaine base and 91 metric tons of cocaine hydrochloride. During 1988 and 1989, United States and Bolivian antinarcotics forces seized a total of 2.2 metric tons of cocaine base and 1.2 tons of cocaine HCL. While these numbers in themselves may appear large, they represent about one-half of one percent of the cocaine produce in Bolivia during this two year period.²⁴

The May 1989 elections resulted in a three way stalemate between Gonazalo Sanchez de Losada representing the MNR, Hugo Banzer Suarez candidate for the ADN, and Jaime Paz Zamora for the MIR. The three parties ran on similar platforms. They endorsed the austerity program, campaigning against drugs, and finding an alternative source of income for the coca farmers. In August 1989,

²³H.R. Rep. 416, p. 52.

²⁴Ibid., p. 40.

Banzer Suarez withdrew his candidacy and formed a unorthodox alliance with Paz Zamora, his adversary from the left. Paz Zamora assumed the presidency on 6 August for a four year term. The government also established a joint political council with undefined powers headed by Banzer Suarez.

The new administration allowed the extradition of Luis Arce Gomez, former colonel in the Bolivian Army and Minister of the Interior under the military government of General Luis Garcia Meza. He was convicted of drug trafficking in Miami in January 1990. Arce Gomez was also previously charged with the murder of seven MIR political leaders and several human rights violations. His extradition created considerable turmoil between the executive and the judicial branches of the Bolivian governments. The courts argued that the president was violating national sovereignty by turning Arce Gomez to the U.S. when he had already been charged in Bolivian courts. The Minister of Interior, Justice, and Migration who accused the Supreme Court of corruption claimed that extradition was the only way to ensure that Arce Gomez receive the appropriate punishment.

Toward the end of 1989 and early 1990, the price of coca leaf in the Chapare region began to drop to the point where many farmers began to consider crop substitution and voluntary eradication. These successes were, according to U.S. congressional investigators, attributed to the Colombian government's crackdown on drug production and trafficking. Their efforts have also had a disruptive effect on the Bolivian coca industry. The investigators also noted that eradication inspectors were few and in some cases,

the coca grower were eradicating non-productive crops and planting new fields in close proximity to those they voluntarily eradicated.²⁵

Drug related issues continue to be the focus of Bolivia-U.S. relations. In February 1990, the U.S. hosted a four-party counter-drug summit in Cartagena, Colombia. The summit sought to address the elimination of illegal drug production through the shared responsibility between producing, trafficking, and consuming countries. The conference attendees were the presidents of Colombia, Peru, Bolivia, and the U.S. During the conference, Jaime Paz Zamora, the Bolivian president, criticized the U.S. approach to drug eradication as too militaristic and claimed that the U.S. did not provide sufficient financial support. The Bolivian government estimated it would need \$939 million to eliminate the coca-cocaine economy and an additional \$3.5 billion aid package over a five year period to transition from coca.²⁶

During the conference, Bolivia and the U.S. struck a compromise. Bolivia agreed to increased involvement by the Bolivian Army in the counter-drug effort in exchange for increased U.S. funding. Annex III of the Document of Cartagena stated:

The control of illegal trafficking in drugs is essentially a law enforcement matter. However, because of its magnitude and the different aspects involved, and in keeping with the sovereign interest of each State and its own judicial system, the armed forces in each of the countries, within their own

²⁵Ibid., p. 66.

²⁶H.R. Rep. 102-412, 101st Cong., 2nd Sess., (1991), p. 54.

territory and national jurisdictions, may also participate. The parties may establish bilateral and multilateral understandings for cooperation in accordance with their interests needs and priorities.²⁷

The military funding was \$33 million in Fiscal Year 1990. The purpose of the funding was for equipping and training two infantry battalions for anti-drug missions, two engineer battalions for civic action programs and a supply and service section. The Air Force received aircraft parts and maintenance assistance. Navy personnel received additional river patrol craft.

In October 1990, members from the Nestor Paz Zamora, a left-wing organization named after the current president's brother, attacked the U.S. Marine embassy guard's living quarters in La Paz resulting in the death of a Bolivian policeman. The attack was in response to the perceived U.S. violation of Bolivian sovereignty and the emphasis the Bolivian government was placing on drug eradication while imposing severe austerity measures on its population. In the meantime, the Bolivian economy was faltering with unemployment and the "black market" created by drug trafficking continued to thrive.

To better understand the context of the drug problem an overview of Bolivia's government, economy, society, etc. is helpful. These factors influence the effectiveness of drug interdiction programs. For example, the export of cocaine is the most profitable export of the Bolivian economy.

²⁷Document of Cartagena, February, 1990.

BOLIVIA: Government

Bolivia became an independent republic in 1825 and established her first constitution in 1826. Bolivia currently governs under her 17th constitution. The governmental powers are divided into three branches: executive, legislative, and judiciary. Equal distribution of power among the three branches has been primarily theoretical. In practice, the executive has ruled through military force and maintained power through decree.

Bolivia's political instability was due, primarily, to strong personal leadership known as *caudillismo* and the disrespect for constitutional political authority by the wealthy and those who govern. Political power and the country's wealth has rested with Bolivians of European decent. The coup became an institutional method to exchange power. The Spanish word *Motin* which equates to mutiny more adequately describes the change of power that occurred often in Bolivian history. While researching Bolivian politics, and discussing the topics with scholars a former U.S. Agency for International development (USAID) chief found an official in his research a manuscript that stated: "Presidents don't know how to step down in time; they have to be shot out of office."²⁸

There are three primary political parties: Leftist Revolutionary Movement (MIR) *Movimiento Izquierda Revolucionario*, National Democratic Action (ADN) *Accion Democratica Nacional*, and the

²⁸McIntyre, "Flamboyant is the Word for Bolivia," National Geographic, February 1966, p. 161.

National Revolutionary Movement (MNR) *Movimeinto Nacional Revolucionario*. The MIR is center-left, the ADN is center-right, and the MNR is center. Bolivia also has political parties that represent the extreme end of both spectrums, but they do not have substantial support.

BOLIVIA: Geography

Bolivia is landlocked with three major ecozones: the arid *altipano*, formed by two parallel Andean ranges in the east running north-south, the temperate region along the valleys of the eastern slopes of the Andes, and the lowlands which are semi-tropical in the north and the east central region and semi-arid region in the southeastern Chaco.

The terrain makes road construction and maintenance difficult. Bolivia has 41,000 kilometers of road; only three percent are paved, 16% are gravel, and 81% are dirt. The railroad system consists of 3,700 kilometers. There are approximately 10,000 miles of inland waterways navigable to commercial traffic.

BOLIVIA: Society

Bolivia had an estimated population of 6.6 million in 1989 with a 2.1% growth rate. Adult illiteracy, according to UNESCO in 1985 was approximately 26% in 1985. The ethnic groups were 55% Indian

(30% Quechua, 25% Aymara), 25-30% Mestizo (Indian and White mixed), and 5-15% European. Bolivians are 95% Catholic.

BOLIVIA: Economy

Bolivia's Gross Domestic Product (GDP) in 1987 was \$4.35 billion. Per capita income was \$640. Between 1980-88, the GDP decreased by an average annual rate of 1.6% in real terms. Unemployment which averaged six percent in the 1970's reached more than 20% in 1987. The annual inflation rate in 1989 was 15% compared with 11,750% in 1985.

Bolivia was the second most agricultural country in South America. In 1988, agriculture contributed 23% of the GDP which grew at an annual rate of 2.1% between 1980-88. It employed 46% of the official labor force. The underground economy, based on contraband, coca production, and other commercial trading in the informal sector, employed two-thirds of Bolivia's workers.²⁹

Industry provided 28% of the GDP in 1988. Industrial production declined at an annual rate of 5.7% between 1980-88. Mining contributed 13% of the GDP and accounted for 46% for legal exports in 1988. Manufacturing, 11% of the GDP in 1988, declined by an average annual rate of 5.6%. Energy, derived from petroleum and natural gas production, accounted for 36% of the legal export earning in 1988. The annual rate of decline between 1980-88 was 0.2%. The

²⁹Bolivia: A Country Study, p. ppxvii.

services sector accounted for 49% of the GDP in 1988; annual rate of decline was 0.2%.

Bolivia's import partners in 1987 were: Brazil (23%), U.S. (19%), and Argentina (14%). Bolivia's export partners were: Argentina (38%), U.S. (17%) and the United Kingdom (11%). In 1990 government sources estimated that \$600 million entered the Bolivian economy annually through the drug trade. In 1988 debt-servicing was 33% of the annual revenue from exports and services.³⁰

In April 1990, the government announced it would privatize 100 of 157 state owned companies to stimulate foreign investment. It also provided guarantees to investors. The offer created a great deal of unrest among the trade unions and opposition parties who fear loss of jobs and overseas control of the economy. The general consensus of the Bolivian economy during the 1980 was a decline.

COCA/COCAINE

The coca leaf was used by the Andean Indians as early as 1500 B.C. The Indians used coca leaves to relieve hunger and fatigue in the high altitude. The practice continues today even though the coca leaf in its processed form produces cocaine. The governments of the coca producing countries allow a specified amount of legally grown coca for consumption as coca. In Bolivia, the ceiling is 12,000 hectares. The coca growing region is in the Chapare in the

³⁰Ibid., p. 123.

department of Cochabamba and Las Yungas, on the foothills of the Andes east of La Paz.

To consume coca, Indians chewed the leaves. To enhance the potency of coca, they usually carried a gourd *poporo* filled with lime. The gourd had a stick at the top that the user moistened to extract small amounts of lime which he would place in his mouth to mix with the coca. The lime served as a catalyst that released the cocaine alkaloid. The effect, however, is much less intense than snorting refined cocaine powder. The alkaloid enters the system through the mucous membrane in the mouth. No evidence currently exists that this practice is harmful. Coca contains calcium, phosphorous and vitamins A and B2.

The coca leaf has four varieties. *Erythroxylum coca* variety *coca* produces the highest yield and prefers the high moist forest as that of the Upper Huallaga Valley, Peru, and the Chapare and Yungas regions in Bolivia. *Erythroxylum coca* variety *ipandu* grows in the rain forests of Ecuador, Peru, Colombia, and Brazil. *Erythroxylum novograntense* variety *novograntense*, found in Colombia, has a potentially high cocaine content but other chemicals hinder its extraction. *Erythroxylum novograntense* variety *truxillense* grows in drier climates in Peru.

Coca grows on a resilient bush that requires little care and is resistant to most pests. If properly fertilized and weeded, a bush can yield up to ten harvests a year. The growers collect the leaves in bags. The bags are emptied and spread over a flat area to dry. Once the leaves dry they are ready for market. Those sold legally remain

in bags and are sold in markets throughout Peru and Bolivia. The illegal leaves are processed into coca paste and then into cocaine hydrochloride. The unit of measure is the *cirga* "load" which equals 100 pounds.

The process of converting coca into cocaine begins with soaking the coca leaves in a vat covered with plastic or polyurethane. The leaves are soaked in a solution of water and sulfuric acid or kerosene and water. About four times a day a *pisador* "stepper" climbs in the vat, usually barefooted and mixes the leaves. Prolonged stays in the solution cause blisters and subsequent infection. After a few days, the leaves are discarded, and the remaining liquid known as *agua rica* "rich water" or coca paste is poured into plastic buckets where it is mixed with lime water, gasoline, more acid, potassium permanganate and ammonia. When the liquid changes to a reddish-brown color it is filtered through a cloth. The liquid is then poured on a cloth sheet where it crystalizes to make cocaine base. From one hectare of leaves come one kilo of base or one acre to 400 grams. The base is then refined by mixing it with ether, acetone, and hydrochloric acid to produce the final product--cocaine hydrochloride. (Figure 3-3)

The chemicals cause considerable health hazards to the populace and destruction to the environment. The lab workers come in direct skin contact with harsh and hazardous chemicals. Often the workers are not aware of the risk. Processing also requires vast quantities of water; therefore, labs were located close to lakes and rivers.




Figure 3-3 Coca Processing Cycle

(Source: "Developing a Drug War Strategy: Lessons Learned From Operation Blast Furnace," Military Review, June 1991)

The chemicals used to process the coca are frequently dumped directly into rivers without regard to environmental damage. To expand cultivation, the growers often used slash and burn techniques on mountain slopes, thereby making the land more vulnerable to erosion.

SUMMARY OF STRATEGIES

1. National Defense Strategy of the United States: The August 1991 National Defense Strategy provides the foundation for establishing U.S. interests and goals in the international arena. It is based on the new era that began with dismantling of the Soviet Union. It states our interests and objectives in the 1990's. The fourth of the interests is: "A stable and secure world, where political and economic freedom, human rights and democratic institutions flourish." This interest has five subordinate objectives. The fourth objective is: "aid in combatting threats to democratic institutions from aggression, coercion, insurgencies, subversion, terrorism and illicit drug trafficking." The Strategy assesses the trends in the world by regions. It establishes a political agenda for the 1990's which includes the drug threat. The Strategy finally assess the economic and political agenda for the 1990's.

2. National Drug Control Strategy: On 5 SEP 89, President Bush presented the first National Drug Control Strategy. It provided the foundation for a national effort to eradicate drug use in the U.S. It mobilized the resources and energies of a myriad of local, state, and

federal agencies to combat drugs at home and abroad. The strategy's resource focus is on corrections, international initiatives, state and local grants, judiciary, other law enforcement, prevention/education, and treatment. It establishes national priorities in the following areas: the criminal justice system, drug treatment, education, community action, the workplace, international initiatives, interdiction efforts, a research agenda, and an intelligence agenda. Though the National Drug Control Strategy is on its fourth iteration. The aim of the strategy to eradicate drug use in the U.S. remains the same.

3. SOUTHCOT Counter Drug Strategy: The SOUTHCOT Strategy is based on the U.S. National Drug Control Strategy of September of 1989. It targets both the demand and supply illicit narcotics, the supply side includes international initiatives and direct interdiction efforts. The Strategy is focused on the Andean Ridge countries of Colombia, Peru, and Bolivia. The strategy targets economic development, civilian drug law enforcement assistance, and military assistance. A principal concern in execution of the Strategy is the potential conflict between the military and democratic institutions and balancing the threat to democracy to the benefits.

4. The Document of Cartagena: On 15 February 1990, President Bush met with the leaders of Peru, Colombia, and Bolivia to develop a counter-drug strategy for the region aimed at addressing the issues of demand, consumption, and supply. The strategy was signed as the Document of Cartagena. The U.S. promised economic assistance for alternative development and crop substitution.

President Bush also agreed to facilitate markets for new trade initiatives and provide incentives to exports and private foreign investment. Though the document was also signed by the presidents of Colombia, Peru, and Bolivia, the signatories were concerned of the political repercussions in there respective countries where the drug trade controls large segment of the economy and is substantial source of employment for the rural populace.

5. Bolivia/U.S. Country Team Counter-Drug Strategy: The Counter-Drug Strategy is based on the Ambassador's Strategy which focuses on three areas: support for democratic institutions, economic growth, and development, and counter-drugs. The counter-drug objective is: "to restrict and ultimately eliminate the production of cocaine for export to the U.S. or other markets for domestic use." The Strategy proposes the use of law enforcement to depress the price of coca leaf, making alternative crops more attractive to primary producers. The Strategy establishes regional objectives to accomplish the overall counter-drug objectives. In the Chapare region, the objective is to: "End availability of coca paste produced in the region." The Beni-Pando-Santa Cruz regional objective is to: "Effect maximum disruption of processing of cocaine hydrochloride in, or its export from this region." The urban area regional objective is to: "Emphasize investigative police work directed against trafficking organizations and significant individual traffickers."

OPERATION "BLAST FURNACE"

In June 1986, then Vice President Bush requested Department of Defense support in a major drug interdiction mission in Bolivia. General Galvin, the CINCSOUTH, assigned the mission to the 193d Infantry Brigade who, in turn, formed Task Force (TF) "Janus" consisting of 170 personnel to comply with with the CINCSOUTH guidance. The lead element for the overall operation was the Bolivian Department of the Interior, and the DEA had the lead for the U.S. elements.

On 15 July 1986, Task Force "Janus" deployed to Bolivia. The drug interdiction mission was entitled Operation "Blast Furnace". The TF consisted of six UH-60 Blackhawk helicopters and a support component with maintenance, logistics, operations, intelligence, and security personnel. The mission as stated in the 193 Infantry Brigade operations order 10-86 was:

Task Force 'Janus' deploys 110700Z JUL 86 to TRINIDAD, BOLIVIA, establishes a rear operating base vicinity TRINIDAD AIRFIELD and conducts aircraft familiarization training of Bolivian Police and DEA personnel, moves to and establishes an initial forward operating base vicinity JOSUANI RANCH, conducts air transport in support of Bolivian Police operations for 60 days under the direction of DEA, provides internal security at forward and rear operating bases for Task Force personnel and equipment within the Rules of Engagement and redeploys to Panama.³¹

³¹324th Support Group, "Operation Blast Furnace After Action Report," 21 November 1986, p. 1.

The DEA and the UMOPAR were responsible for locating and destroying cocaine production laboratories.³² These labs had previously been outside the range of interdiction operations. The UH-60 extended range of counter-drug forces by 50 miles.

Bast Furnace's original objective to disrupt cocaine production for 60 days was extended an additional two months during the operation. Some indications of the disruption were the reduction in the cost of coca leave from \$120 to \$15 per 100 pounds of leaves. The reduction indicated a glut in the market caused by the inability of the drug traffickers to move or process their product. Another indication were reports that alleged that approximately 200 drug traffickers departed to Panama and another 600 to Paraguay to escape possible arrest.³³

The Task Force aircraft arrived in Santa Cruz, Bolivia via C-5 on 15 July 1986 from Howard Air Force Base (AFB) in Panama. Upon arrival, the UH-60's self-deployed 400 miles to the north to a forward operating base which was a drug trafficker's ranch confiscated by the Bolivian authorities. The main body followed two days later via C-130's. It set up operations at a rear operating base at the city Trinidad in the department of the Beni.

The concept of the operation was to establish a fixed rear operating base and three mobile forward bases. The maintenance and intelligence processing facilities were located at the rear base

³²Abbott, p. 95.

³³Ibid., p. 102.

and the DEA/UMOPAR strike forces were at the forward bases. operational and intelligence planning assistance to the bilateral drug law enforcement agencies was also provided by U.S. military personnel. The U.S. Air Force resupplied most of the Task Force's needs by weekly C-130 flights from Howard AFB to the rear operating base. Fuel resupply was provided by an additional C-130 from La Paz. (Figure 3-4)

Strikes were typically conducted with two UH-60's to ensure safety in case of emergency landings. A strike team generally consisted of a Bolivian Air Force officer, a DEA agent, a SATCOM operator, and 18 UMOPAR and DEA agents. The UH-60's normally landed approximately one kilometer from the target and remained there between 30 minutes to three hours depending on the target. the drug law enforcement personnel conducted the ground search, raid, and seizure of evidence. Key participants were debriefed at the conclusion of the mission. Higher headquarters were informed of the daily activities through situation reports.³⁴

Blast Furnace created extreme controversy. Bolivia's President Victor Paz Estenssoro received criticism within the country. Some of the Bolivian populace saw it as a violation of Bolivian sovereignty. They claimed that their president had allowed a foreign military force to direct actions against Bolivian citizens. Other Latin American

³⁴324th Support Group, p. 2.

countries, specifically members of the Organization of Latin American States and Cuba, also criticized the use of U.S. military forces.³⁵

The TF departed Bolivia in mid-November 1986.

³⁵Abbott, p. 102.




Figure 3-4 Operation "Blast Furnace"
 (Source: 324th Support Group: "Operation Blast Furnace After Action Report," 1986)

OPERATION "SNOWCAP"

After Operation "Blast Furnace," the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) began Operation "Snowcap" in March 1987. "Snowcap" involved personnel from the DEA, State Department, U.S. Coast Guard, Border Patrol, U.S. Army, and host nation counter-drug forces. It was a Latin American counter-drug campaign designed to reduce the flow of cocaine into the U.S. by 50% in three years. "Snowcap" targeted the destruction of clandestine air strips, coca processing labs, and drug trafficker operations.³⁶

To avoid unnecessary confrontation with the Bolivian populace, unlike "Blast Furnace," "Snowcap" does not use U.S. military personnel to transport host country counter-drug forces to and from interdiction targets. "Snowcap" is primarily a law enforcement effort conducted in a paramilitary fashion. Department of Defense (DoD) personnel participate on a cost reimbursable basis with the Narcotics Assistance Unit (NAU) paying for all DoD services, supplies, and personnel. Specifically, U.S. military personnel provide logistical support, operational planning assistance, and training of the host country counter-drug forces in police training camps.

In 1989, "Snowcap" evolved into the Andean Initiative of the National Drug Control Strategy. An objective of the Andean Strategy

³⁶H.R. Rep., 416, p. 16.

was a 15% reduction in cocaine entering the U.S. within two years and 60% over 10 years.³⁷

SAN RAMON RAID

San Ramon is a town in the northwest corner of Bolivia in the Beni department. On 8 November 1989, Bolivian and U.S. drug law enforcement agents raided San Ramon under the auspices of "Snowcap." The objective of the raid was to capture or destroy cocaine processing facilities reportedly around the town, seize deposits of precursor chemicals and arms and capture a leading Bolivian drug trafficking kingpin "Yayo" Rodriguez. Additional objectives were to demonstrate U.S. resolve in support in attacking drug traffickers and show of capability.³⁸ Two previous raids in 1989 attempted by the DEA had met with less than favorable results. The first was in the town of Santa Ana which resulted in four fatalities and the forced withdrawal of the DEA/UMOPAR raiders who were attacked by irate townspeople and fired upon by the local naval garrison. The second previous raid on the town of San Joaquin was compromised by a Bolivian Army Colonel who tipped the drug traffickers of the impending raid.

³⁷Ibid., p. 17.

³⁸U.S. Southern Command Briefing, "Challenge of Counternarcotics in Latin America," 1991, p. 11.

A special SOUTHCOM team planned the raid with 30 DEA agents and 300 UMOPAR personnel assigned to execute it. Three Bolivian Air Force C-130's and nine UH-1H helicopters and various other aircraft transported the raiders to their targets. Personnel from the Bolivian Justice Department accompanied the raiders to ensure compliance with civil laws.

The raid involved the deployment of Bolivian UMOPAR personnel from La Paz via C-130 and helicopters from forward operating bases in northwest Bolivia. The raiders surrounded the town and attacked predetermined targets. These targets were the result of extensive collaborative information gathering from informers and intelligence analysis by the SOUTHCOM personnel. The UMOPAR personnel were not informed of their targets until the aircraft were airborne.

The U.S. Embassy declared the raid an overall success. It resulted in the arrest or confiscation of the following items: 47 personnel (Argentines, Brazilians, and Bolivians), three airplanes, 50 weapons, two cases of hand grenades, 10 motorcycles, 12 trucks, 25 new VHF radios, fifty 55 gallon drums of precursor chemicals, 4.8 kilos of cocaine hydrochloride, 11 labs seized, 6 houses (in Santa Cruz), extensive documents, and 1000 pounds of explosives.³⁹
(Figure 3-5)

³⁹Ibid., p. 18.




Figure 3-5 San Ramon Raid

U.S. NAVAL PARTICIPATION

U.S. Naval participation began in 1990. Like that of the U.S. Army Special Forces teams it was limited to provide training and technical assistance to the Bolivian Navy counter-drug forces--the "Blue Devils" in riverine operations. United States Navy personnel were allowed to accompany the "Blue Devils" in training missions only. The Bolivian Navy operational missions were to interdict coca products and precursor chemicals. The "Blue Devils," like their Bolivian Air Force counterparts, transported UMOPAR personnel accompanied by DEA and U.S. Coast Guard representatives.

The concept of operations is to patrol the vast Bolivian riverine waterways in Pirahna river craft (Boston Whalers) operating from a "mother ship" that provided logistical support. The UMOPAR personnel board suspected boats that may be carrying illegal cargo. The "mother ships" operate from four permanent bases in eastern Bolivia.

CHAPTER FOUR

ANALYSIS

This chapter provides the baseline data to answer the thesis question: Are U.S. personnel in Bolivia employing the low intensity conflict (LIC) imperatives in executing the Bolivia/U.S. Counter-Drug Strategy?

The thesis first subdivides each of the LIC imperatives to form a doctrinal checklist for the analysis. Next, it addresses the actions of U.S. military personnel in Operations "Blast Furnace" and "Snowcap" conducted in Bolivia against the LIC imperatives for compliance based on the Bolivia/U.S. Counter-Drug Strategy objectives. The Strategy objective was to restrict and ultimately eliminate the production of cocaine for export to the U.S. or other markets for domestic use.

The study used the LIC imperatives because they represent doctrinally accepted concepts that must be considered for the successful planning and execution of LIC missions. Since the counter-drug mission is classified as a subset of peacetime contingency operations, the imperatives were appropriate as analytical tools. The checklist was intended to focus the reader on the areas of priority in the planning and execution of LIC missions. The study has

prioritized the LIC imperatives into two categories. Political dominance and legitimacy are of higher importance than unity of effort, perseverance, and adaptability. Failure to comply with either political dominance and legitimacy will automatically render a negative answer in determining compliance with the imperatives overall. Compliance with the imperatives requires conforming to political dominance and legitimacy and compliance with any two of the three which are unity of effort, perseverance, or adaptability.

Political dominance and legitimacy provide the foundation for a government's ability to exercise its power. They are both closely tied to a government's legality as it is viewed by its populace and provide the basis for a country's judicial system. Unity of effort, perseverance, and adaptability are also critical and the cumulative effect of non-compliance with these will have a negative impact.

Operations "Blast Furnace" and "Snowcap" provided a vehicle to analyze the actions of U.S. military participants in the counter-drug mission. These operations are illustrative examples of the execution of counter-drug strategy. They provide an opportunity to validate the imperatives as an analytical tool and perhaps demonstrate weaknesses and strength in how strategy translates into tactical operations. Analyzing the lessons learned will allow the military personnel to optimize their resources in planning and executing this type of mission. They were also sizeable enough to provide a representative "slice" of the type of activities required of U.S. military personnel.

"Blast Furnace" was the first major counter-drug mission conducted by U.S. military personnel outside the U.S. It provided a baseline for future involvement. Operation "Snowcap" which began in 1987 is on-going. The study focused its analysis of "Snowcap" primarily on the San Ramon raid. The raid was planned by military personnel from SOUTHCOM and executed by the DEA and UMOPAR agents. The execution of the raid was the culmination of U.S. military training and planning efforts.

POLITICAL DOMINANCE

The following are the components of political dominance:

1. In LIC operations, political objectives drive military decisions at every level from the strategic to the tactical.
2. All commanders and staff officers must understand these political objectives and the impact of military operations on them.
3. They must adopt courses of action which legally support those objectives even if the courses of action appear to be unorthodox or outside what traditional doctrine had contemplated.

COMPLIANCE/ANALYSIS TO POLITICAL DOMINANCE IN "BLAST FURNACE"

The U.S. Military complied with elements one and three of political dominance during Operation "Blast Furnace."

The U.S. military's mission was to:

. . . to provide air transportation, at the direction of the U.S. Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) contingent . . . to Bolivian counter-drug police forces as they sought to destroy cocaine production laboratories. The U.S. ambassador retained overall responsibility for U.S. involvement in the operation.⁴⁰

The first factor of political dominance states that political decisions drive operations from the strategic to tactical levels. The political objective initiating "Blast Furnace" came from an announcement by the Reagan administration's "War on Drugs" in the April 1986. The political objective of operation "Blast Furnace" was ultimately the American people. The President wanted to send a message that expressed his opposition to drugs and to indicate his resolve attacking both demand and supply. Bolivia was a major target of drug supply. The National Security Decision Directive (NSDD) on Narcotics and National Security authorized direct military involvement in the counter-drug effort provided the following conditions were met: They had to be invited by the host nation, their actions would be directed by U.S. government agencies, and the efforts would be limited to a support function.⁴¹ The Chief of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS) directed the CINCSOUTH to support the U.S. Ambassador's counter-drug strategy objectives. The deployment of Task Force Janus to Bolivia was the tactical level action resulting from the strategic decision.

⁴⁰Abbott, p. 95.

⁴¹Ibid.

The operation did not comply with the second element. The commander did not understand the impact of the military operation on the political objective. He did not foresee the level of protest the operation would raise in the host nation. The opposition political parties, labor unions, and the coca growers vehemently opposed the President Paz Estenssoro Administration's permission to allow the TF Janus to assist the Bolivian Rural Mobile Patrol Unit (UMOPAR) *Unidad Mobil de Patrullaje Rural*. The opposition nearly toppled the Paz Estenssoro government.⁴² They viewed the counter-drug mission as a violation of Bolivian sovereignty.

"Blast Furnace" complied with the third element of political dominance. The course of action Task Force Janus took was legal in accordance with U.S. laws. The 11 April 1986 NSDD provided legal authorization for the U.S. military. It complied with international law because the NSDD stipulated that the U.S. military could render assistance if invited by the host government, directed by U.S. government agencies, and limited to a support function.

The action was legal under Bolivian law because the government can, and often has, ruled by decree. The Bolivian opposition, however, did not agree with the Paz Estenssoro version of what constituted a legal course of action according to Bolivian law. They viewed U.S. military action as an act of illegal imperialistic aggression.⁴³ The coca growers, represented by their union, and the

⁴²Fishel, "Toward an Effective Drug War Strategy," Military Review, June 1991, p. 1.

⁴³Ibid.

COB opposed the operation because it impacted directly on their only source of income. With Bolivia's annual per capita income in 1988 at \$640, coca provides the possibility for substantially greater earnings. The number of coca growers has grown with the demand for the cocaine. The new growers can be compared with prospectors headed to the gold fields. Because the coca plant requires little care, is resistant to most pest, and provides up to ten harvests yearly, it continues to attract more growers. As more growers become involved in coca cultivation, their political voice increases in opposition to any eradication or interdiction efforts. Many of the coca growers are unemployed tin miners looking for a way to make a living. As tin prices collapsed more miners became coca growers.

The decision by the Paz Estenssoro government to allow the conduct of "Blast Furnace" was partially based on political survival. The U.S was on the verge of cutting off aid for not meeting coca eradication targets. In 1985, Bolivia was experiencing five digit hyperinflation and could not afford the loss of U.S. assistance. Additionally, Paz Estenssoro feared losing control of the government to drug traffickers. The 1980-82 Garcia Meza presidency had blatantly allowed the drug traffickers to operate in Bolivia. Drug traffickers were allowed to operate with impunity. Even the key government officials were drug traffickers. One of the most notorious was Garcia Meza's Minister of the Interior, Arce Gomez, who was tried in a Miami court for drug trafficking in 1990. The previous president Siles Suazo had been kidnapped by drug

traffickers in 1984. Paz Estenssoro had the unenviable task of choosing between loss of popularity with the electorate by allowing the U.S. into Bolivia or refusing U.S. assistance and, thereby, losing U.S. financial aid. The latter option would have been more popular with his electorate, but he ran the risk of becoming a victim of the drug trafficker's power.

COMPLIANCE/ANALYSIS TO POLITICAL DOMINANCE IN "SNOWCAP"

Operation "Snowcap" complied with all three element of political dominance. The political objective was a continuation of the need to show resolve in the counter-drug effort to the American people by attacking the problem at the source. Originally, the drug debate was based on the U.S. blaming the Latin American drug producing nations for the drug supply problem. The Latin American nations blamed the U.S. for not controlling consumption. As the problem increased in magnitude, both began to realize each were partially responsible for demand and supply.

In February 1987, the U.S. and Bolivian governments established the framework for a bilateral drug control agreement based on mutual cooperation. Included in the agreement was Operation "Snowcap." It provided the vehicle to execute the enforcement of the bilateral drug control agreement. On 21 July 1988, the Bolivian government passed a law making the cultivation of coca illegal in most of the country.

The U.S. military involvement in "Snowcap;" specifically, the San Ramon raid was to provide training and planning assistance to the Bolivian/U.S. counter-drug personnel in the enforcement of the Bolivian laws and bilateral agreements on coca eradication targets. The participation was in a support role, and U.S. personnel were not allowed to accompany the counter-drug personnel in the execution of the raid.

The U.S. military staff for the San Ramon raid understood the political objectives.⁴⁴ Their guidance from the CINCSOUTH was to provide whatever planning assistance the DEA and UMOPAR needed to execute the raid successfully. One of the planners was sent early to meet with the DEA chief to define the requirements. His instructions reiterated that the military was subordinate to the DEA, and the planning team was required to maintain a low profile. This excluded participation in the conduct of the raid.

The military personnel training the UMOPAR in the paramilitary tactics required to execute the raid also understood the political objectives. Prior to their training deployments the personnel are thoroughly briefed on their mission. Conversations with the trainers, on site, in the Chapare region verified their understanding of the political objectives. Their frustration stemmed from the difficulty in measuring progress.

⁴⁴Information provided in a conversation with Bruce King who was one of the six SOUTHCOM member of the planning team for the San Ramon raid in April 1992.

The planning and execution of the San Ramon raid was legal in accordance with both Bolivian and U.S. law. The plan called for the search of homes, seizure of illegal drugs and contraband, and the arrest of drug traffickers and processors where probable cause was established. The raid included legal personnel to ensure that the rights of the accused were properly represented. The raid targeted only the homes where collaborative evidence indicated the presence of illegal activity. Many of the arrested were released by the UMOPAR to the local authorities for the disposition of the cases.

The UMOPAR acted within their legal authority to arrest since they are a part of the Bolivian National Police with jurisdiction throughout the country. The legal system, however, worked in favor of the 23 Bolivian nationals arrested in the raid who were transported to La Paz for disposition of their cases. Within 10 days they were released due to lack of sufficient basis for their arrest. The U.S. military complied with the legal restriction that precluded them from direct participation in the operation.

UNITY OF EFFORT

Unity of effort is comprised of the following elements:

1. Military leaders must integrate their efforts with other governmental agencies to gain a mutual advantage in LIC.
2. Military planners must consider how their actions contribute to initiatives which are also political, economic, and psychological in nature.

3. Commanders may answer to civilian chiefs or may themselves employ the resources of civilian agencies.

COMPLIANCE/ANALYSIS TO UNITY OF EFFORT IN "BLAST FURNACE"

Actions during "Blast Furnace" did not comply with the first and third elements of unity of effort. The military was not properly integrated with other government agencies. Integration implies unification, interoperability, and the creation of one organization from the sum of various parts. This process requires time to optimize the capabilities of the integrated organization. The commander of Task Force "Janus" was informed of his mission two weeks before the unit arrived in Bolivia. Given the complexity of the mission, this was an insufficient amount of time to allow for interagency integration. A comparison can be made of the preparation time required for a mechanized infantry battalion task force field training exercise (FTX). The integration of the armor company from another battalion can take more than a month if the battalion has not worked with the company before.

Several other factors impacted on Task Force Janus' failure to comply with integration. The Task Force was the consolidation of personnel from a wide variety of military skills which included intelligence, logistics, maintenance, and operational skills. They had little time to rehearse their new organization prior to deployment. Their efforts to integrate in country were further hampered by the

30 day rotation policy for its personnel. It was also in support of bi-national police organizations, and both the military and the police were unfamiliar with each other's operational procedures.

The lack of integration manifested itself when U.S. military personnel and DEA officials did not agree on targets from the military's perspective. The DEA would sometimes divert from attacking a target for what was most often a futile attempt to make arrests. These diversions occurred on the way to the target after the strike had been planned in detail. Even though the DEA was in charge, the military had the responsibility of planning the raids, and failure to execute an agreed to target exhibited the lack of integration.

Integration did not exist with the host country agencies. At the tactical level, the U.S. participants did not divulge the location of the targets to their Bolivian UMOPAR counterparts on the raids until the aircraft were airborne. U.S. personnel were concerned with UMOPAR operational security violations which involved informing the drug traffickers of impending raids. This arrangement was successful in finding 22 cocaine labs and considerable amounts of precursor chemicals. Success, however, did not include any cocaine seizures of any significance nor any arrests.⁴⁵ The bi-national forces could not act as a unified force because the Bolivians were not informed of the targets until the last minute. Because the UMOPAR personnel were being briefed on their targets in the aircraft and the operating range

⁴⁵Abbott, p. 96.

of the UH-60 is 150 miles and the speed of the aircraft is approximately 200 mph, the UMOPAR had little opportunity to rehearse each raid.

At the strategic level, integration was also weak. One of the primary reasons for allowing TF Janus into Bolivia was because the Bolivian government risked losing U.S. financial support for not taking what the U.S. government saw as appropriate measures to interdict the drug flow. Corruption, economic and political disorder were the greatest single causes for lack of unity of effort between the U.S. and Bolivian elements. The Paz Estenssoro government took power in 1985 amid five digit inflation, strikes, and a crash of the tin market which had historically been one of Bolivia's principal exports. A U.S. journalist in Bolivia during "Blast Furnace" quoted a former Minister of the Interior from a previous Bolivian government views on corruption:

The police are corrupt at every level. No wonder cocaine is not being seized. The traffickers are being warned.....If you notice, there haven't been that many arrests either. President Paz is quite serious but he isn't getting too much cooperation from the National Police. He recently had to sack the Police Commanding General and the Chief of the Narcotics Squad in Santa Cruz for obvious corruption.⁴⁶

If this statement is true, it is difficult to imagine a case where the corrupt government officials would contribute much cooperation to defeating the drug traffickers who provide them money to reduce

⁴⁶Ibid., p. 99.

the effectiveness of the counter-drug operations. These officials often hold key positions in the execution of the counter-drug strategy.

The military planners did not comply with the second element. They did not incorporate psychological operations (PSYOP), civil affairs (CA), or proper operational security into their planning. Toward the end of Blast Furnace, the raiders attacked a small village that was the gathering place of known traffickers. Before the raiders arrived the inhabitants were warned of the impending raid. When the contingent arrived, the villagers responded with anger and were successful in forcing the raiders to depart prematurely. The reaction may have been less severe if the populace had been informed of the government's strategy toward interdiction and the evils of drug trafficking through a well planned PSYOP campaign prior to the raid. Civil Affairs projects accompanying the PSYOP mission exemplifying the government's commitment to its people would have added a more positive synergistic effect.⁴⁷

Another similar example of a PSYOP/CA failure occurred in the city of Trinidad. The U.S. military personnel were located at the airport outside of town away from the local population. As a result of Blast Furnace, the local economy had gone into recession because it relied on the drug trade. The U.S. military contingent did not plan any PSYOP campaign or CA projects to alleviate the negative impact of "Blast Furnace" on the economy. As a result of the failure to

⁴⁷Fishel, p. 4.

interact, U.S. military personnel did not acquire any human intelligence on the drug traffickers. The U.S. participants were viewed as outsiders and invaders by the population of Trinidad.

There was compliance with the third element. During Operation "Blast Furnace" the U.S. military forces supported the DEA with technical, logistical, and operational support under the operational control of the U.S. Ambassador. The U.S. personnel did not direct operations in the field. Their mission was to ferry the drug law enforcement agents to and from their targets.

COMPLIANCE/ANALYSIS TO UNITY OF EFFORT IN OPERATION "SNOWCAP"

The San Ramon Raid did not comply with the first element of unity of effort which requires military leaders to integrate their efforts with other U.S. government agencies. Though U.S. military personnel began preparations to work with the DEA three months prior to the execution of the San Ramon raid, the actual planning team did not arrive in country until a week prior to the execution. More time in country would have allowed the planners to study the area more adequately which may have included personal aerial observations of the target. Political restrictions did not allow the military planners to accompany the raiders. The restriction limited the ability of the planner who conceived the plan to make on-site adjustments to the plan's execution. The SOUTHCOM planning team did not integrate with the Bolivian agencies. The team worked

directly for the DEA and had no contact with Bolivian agencies. Integration with the Bolivians was done through the DEA.

The U.S. military personnel did provide intelligence analysis and operational planning for the raid. The intelligence analysis included a thorough study of the town from aerial photographs and the location of suspected drug trafficker's homes collaborated by confidential informants. Don Ferrone, DEA Chief in Bolivia, stated that some informants stood in front of the drug trafficker's home and even photographed family members.⁴⁸

The failure to integrate the SOUTHCOM personnel was done to deemphasize U.S. military participation and to avoid operational security (OPSEC) violations. The raid began with three C-130's from La Paz and a supporting attack from forward bases in Trinidad in eastern Bolivia with nine UH-1's. The U.S. Embassy netted the operation a "success" though a congressional committee was less generous in their assessment. The committee indicated that the Bolivian UMOPAR personnel were not told what the target was until they were airborne to avoid violations of operational security. The pilots in La Paz were initially told they were headed toward the Chilean border to intercept a shipment of precursor chemicals. Even with these operational security precautions, the drug traffickers were aware that a possible raid on San Ramon was likely. Don Ferrone and his staff indicated that a La Paz newspaper quoted Colombian traffickers stating that a raid on the San Ramon area was

⁴⁸British Broadcasting Company and Arts and Entertainment Network, "The Rat's Nest" 1991.

eminent. Another newspaper indicated that planes stolen by the "Yayo" Rodriguez organization were parked at a runway in San Ramon a week prior to the raid. Shortly after the article appeared, the planes left. Ferrone also described a conversation with the Commander of the UMOPAR. In the conversation, the commander indicated the precise location of the target area even though the information had not been released to the Bolivians to avoid tipping off the drug traffickers.

The SOUTHCOM briefing on the raid described the combined arms team with the following participating agencies: U.S. Ambassador/Deputy Chief of Mission, International Narcotics Matters (INM), Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA), Combined Intelligence Team, U.S. Army Special Forces A-Team, U.S. Southern Command (SOUTHCOM), Bolivian Drug Strike Force, UMOPAR National Police, Bolivian Air Force, Bolivian media, commercial airline companies, Bolivian Justice System, and Bolivian chemists. The fact that they participated does not necessarily qualify them as a combined arms team. Integration, an integral element in unity of effort, implies that the agencies were functioning as one. This could hardly be the case if the Bolivians are not brought into the execution of the plan until the last minute. Also, given the number of participants and OPSEC, concerns it is difficult to believe that operational information would not get out given the corruption that exists.

An example of possible breach of OPSEC by the U.S. occurred when the UMOPAR commander told DEA Chief the exact location of

the target several days before the raid. This information not to be released to the Bolivians until they were airborne en route to San Ramon. If the UMOPAR commander knew the target location, it is reasonable to assume that other Bolivians also knew. Operational security violations indicated a major reason why neither major drug traffickers nor any major amounts of cocaine were captured or confiscated.

The raid complied with the second element of unity of effort which deals with the military planner's requirement to consider how his actions contribute to initiatives which are psychological, economical, and political in nature. Besides complying with the strategic objective to reduce the illicit drugs, the raid was also intended to send drug traffickers a psychological message that they could expect more raids in the future, and they were now in the operating range of the counter-drug forces. The drug traffickers were aware that the operating range of the UH-1 helicopter stationed in the forward operating in Trinidad is approximately 100 miles. To avoid entanglements with the law, the drug traffickers located their processing labs outside the operating range of the UH-1. To extend their range, the helicopters flew beyond the round trip range by fly to San Ramon to be refueled by the C-130 bringing the UMOPAR. from La Paz. The C-130 also extended the range to any site within Bolivia that has a C-130 capable runway.

The raid caused some economic turmoil in San Ramon. The raid disrupted the flow of drugs through San Ramon and, consequently, its primary source of income. The raid was a police action directed at

specific individuals suspected of trafficking in drugs. The counter-drug forces did not arbitrarily arrest all the town's people. The confiscation of precursor chemicals, weapons, stolen aircraft, and explosives impacted the previous owners economically.

The political turmoil from the San Ramon raid was much less severe than "Blast Furnace." The raid did not have the high visibility presence of U.S. military personnel to arouse the anger of the populace. The town's people suspected of illegal activities were in possession of illegal firearms, precursor chemicals, and stolen property. They could not easily claim that the authorities were taking away their livelihood since the coca was found in the illegal zone.

The majority of Bolivia's newspapers supported the raid; however, some left wing and opposition newspapers were quick to exaggerate the raid's activities. In a discussion following the raid, U.S. Ambassador Gelbard and Don Ferrone discussed a newspaper article in Trinidad reporting that U.S. personnel had sacked San Ramon. In La Paz, a candidate from the Minister of the Interior's political party embellished the story even further. In a speech, the candidate stated that the Americans had stolen a golden chalice from the church in San Ramon.

The U.S. military personnel were under the operational control of the ambassador, thereby, complying with the third element of unity of effort.

A major factor that was not conducive to integrated operations which applied to both "Blast Furnace" and "Snowcap" was the

animosity that still exists between the Bolivian military and police. Both have been contenders for national political power. During the 1952 revolution and the 1964 coup, factions representing the police and the army confronted each other in armed conflict. In a conversation with the commander of the Bolivian Command and General Staff College equivalent in May 1989, he stated that continued U.S military training and equipping of the Bolivian Police would result in renewed conflict because the police would feel capable of confronting the army.

Conversations with U.S. Army and Navy trainers in 1991 confirmed the animosity. In an incident that occurred in the spring of 1991, Bolivian soldiers severely beat an UMOPAR agent outside a training facility in the Chapare region. According to U.S. Army trainers, allegedly, the agent was beaten because he belonged to the UMOPAR. The trainers showed pictures presented to them by the UMOPAR as evidence one week after the beating. The U.S. Navy trainer informed me that during his entire training cycle, the Bolivian Navy personnel refused to associate with the UMOPAR personnel. Even to the extent that they would not eat their meals in the same mess facility with the UMOPAR.

A 1990 congressional report confirms the observations the U.S. trainers reported:

(1) UMOPAR personnel are by and large recruited from the national police, which is separate from the three military services and perceived by the military to be an inferior organization, (2) national police units in Latin America are traditionally held in low esteem, and (3) UMOPAR is receiving

advanced training, equipment, and funding from western governments at a time when the Bolivian military is experiencing reductions in its own budget.⁴⁹

This attitude contradicts the component of integration described in the unity of effort. The animosity goes well beyond the routine interagency rivalries common to most governments. It is a hostility borne of three armed confrontations that have occurred over the past five decades.

ADAPTABILITY

The elements of adaptability are:

1. Adaptability is the skill and willingness to change, modify, or create new structures or methods to accommodate different situations.
2. It requires careful mission analysis, comprehensive intelligence, and regional expertise.

COMPLIANCE/ANALYSIS TO ADAPTABILITY IN "BLAST FURNACE"

Actions during "Blast Furnace" complied with the first element of adaptability. The TF had the skill and willingness to modify doctrine to accommodate the transportation mission for the DEA and UMOPAR. The 193d Infantry Brigade selected military personnel

⁴⁹H.R., Rep., p. 55.

with most of the requisite technical operational, intelligence, and logistical skills to accommodate the counter-drug support mission. Task Force "Janus" employed modified aviation doctrine to establish a fixed rear operating base (ROB) at Trinidad and several forward operating bases (FOB) that changed locations based on the targets. The UH-60 helicopter operated from the FOB's. Remote refueling sites were established to strike targets beyond the operational radius of the helicopters. The UH-60's operated in pairs to enhance safety given the rugged terrain and the possible threat from the drug traffickers. Weekly C-130 U.S. Air Force flights from Howard Air Force Base in Panama to the Trinidad ROB sustained the supply and personnel rotation flow. A C-130 stationed at La Paz provided fuel deliveries, assisted in the relocation of the FOB's, and delivered cargo between bases. The effectiveness of the latter C-130 was limited by maintenance problems.⁵⁰

Task Force "Janus" partially complied with the second element of adaptability. Initially, the Task Force concentrated on the coca growers and the coca paste labs which had little impact on the disruption of the drug flow since they addressed the lowest rung of the coca processing ladder. Through a thorough mission analysis and lessons learned in country, U.S. military personnel discovered that the coca base/cocaine hydrochloride labs were the center of gravity. The labs were the point where one found the precursor chemicals, processed drugs, transportation assets, and drug traffickers.

⁵⁰324th Support Group, p. 17.

Attacking these labs had an immediate impact on the industry.⁵¹ Intelligence analysts modified the intelligence preparation of the battlefield (IPB) to identify the coca growing regions and transportation networks capable of sustaining the drug producer and processor's needs. Photographs and data from informants added to template potential targets. The IPB was also used to determine the location coca base/cocaine HCL processing labs.

The IPB information was provided to the U.S. military logistics and operational planners, pilots, and DEA and UMOPAR personnel who based their mission accordingly. They used the information to discuss the target type, the threat, logistical support and the number of aircraft required. Once all their questions were answered, coordination for the next day's operations began.⁵²

The Task Force lacked personnel with regional expertise. The intelligence personnel did not speak fluent Spanish, a requirement to be a regional expert. The lack of language skills was not conducive to adequate interaction with the Bolivian who may have provided the American planners additional information. The translation process limited the amount of information available to the planners.

⁵¹Fishel, p. 3.

⁵²324th Support Group, p. 2.

COMPLIANCE/ANALYSIS OF ADAPTABILITY IN "SNOWCAP"

The actions during the San Ramon raid complied with the first element of adaptability. Prior to the San Ramon raid, the DEA and UMOPAR had made a raid on the town of Santa Ana near the Brazilian border to arrest a notorious drug trafficker. The raid was not properly planned or executed. The DEA and UMOPAR met with armed resistance from the townspeople which resulted in four deaths. The UMOPAR helicopter was also fired upon by the local Bolivian Navy detachment.

The raid on San Ramon applied the lessons learned from the failures of the Santa Ana raid. The U.S. military provided a special six man planning cell from the SOUTHCOM staff. The participants were experts in operations, intelligence, and logistics. The cell was structured to meet the DEA/UMOPAR counter-drug planning requirements. The planning incorporated the police and paramilitary aspects of their mission. Some UMOPAR agents were to surround the town and provide security while other agents were to confiscate illegal property and make arrests.

The raid also complied with the second aspect of adaptability. In a discussion with one of the planning team members, he stated that they modified the IPB to meet the needs of the mission. The team had aerial photography and collaborated intelligence from confidential informers as to the location of known targets. Unlike "Blast Furnace" at least one of the two members of the intelligence experts was a Latin American foreign area officer (FAO). Both were

fluent in Spanish and were knowledgeable in the Andean Ridge countries which include Bolivia.

LEGITIMACY

Legitimacy is comprised of the following:

1. Legitimacy is the willing acceptance of the right of the government to govern or of a group or agency to make and enforce decisions.
2. Legitimacy derives from the perception that the authority is genuine and effective and uses proper agencies for reasonable purposes.

COMPLIANCE/ANALYSIS TO LEGITIMACY IN "BLAST FURNACE"

"Blast Furnace" did not comply with the first aspect of legitimacy. From a strictly U.S. perspective, the use of U.S. combat troops to support the interdiction effort was legal and acceptable to the American people. The U.S. government felt its national security was threatened by the drug threat and was obligated to confront the threat with the most effective means possible. The U.S. government sanctioned the expanded military role in the 11 April 1986 National Security Decision Directive (NSDD).

The perception of legitimacy on the Bolivian side opposed U.S. interdiction efforts and viewed the right of the government to

govern and enforce decisions from an entirely different perspective. Numerous newspaper articles strongly protested the U.S. military's direct support role as a violation of Bolivian sovereignty. These views were shared by significant elements in Latin America to include the Organization of American States.⁵³ The most vocal opposition was the labor movement. The Bolivian Labor Federation (COB) *Central Obrera Boliviana*, in a show of solidarity with the Bolivian Coca Growers Union, supported nationwide protests against "Blast Furnace."

"Blast Furnace" did not comply with the second element of legitimacy. The Bolivians did not perceive that the proper agency was conducting the counter-drug effort. The focus of the Bolivian protest against "Blast Furnace" was directed at the the use of military forces in the counter-drug role. They compared it with the U.S. invasion of Vietnam. The U.S. government selected the U.S. military because it was one of the few agencies with the necessary skills and equipment to confront the drug threat.⁵⁴

The inability of the Bolivian government to achieve a broad consensus on the legitimacy of its actions against drugs is based on a history of political instability. The Paz Estenssoro government was in desperate need of U.S. economic assistance when it allowed the U.S. military to participate in "Blast Furnace." It had replaced the previous government a year early because the previous

⁵³Abbott, p. 104.

⁵⁴Abbott, p. 100.

administration could not cope with the economic and political problems that confronted the country. His political survival hinged on external economic support which the U.S. threatened to cut if Bolivia failed to show progress in eradicating the coca. Paz Estenssoro's apprehension to losing political control of the military were well founded. From 1980-82, the country was ruled by one of the most corrupt military governments in the hemisphere that permitted drug traffickers to operate with impunity.

Bolivian apprehension with foreign military involvement is based on the loss of every war it has fought with its neighbors and the past history of repressive military governments. Bolivia lost to Chile, Brazil, and Paraguay. Each defeat resulted in the loss of terrain and created additional political instability. The most significant and still the most contested was the loss of its outlet to the sea. Also 113 of the 167 years of Bolivian history have been under military rule which have often been repressive. Allowing the U.S. to conduct an eradication campaign renewed some of these apprehensions.

COMPLIANCE/ANALYSIS TO LEGITIMACY IN "SNOWCAP"

The San Ramon raid complied with both aspects of legitimacy. The target was a known haven for Bolivian, Colombian, Argentine, and Brazilian drug traffickers and had been identified as such in Bolivian newspapers. Some of its visitors included members of the infamous Gacha family from Colombia. The Bolivian campesino coca grower was not a direct victim of the raid; therefore, popular

indignation was minimal. The U.S. participation in the raid was restricted to planning the operation and training the UMOPAR.

The raid also complied with second aspect of legitimacy. The arrests were made by the UMOPAR. The appropriate legal personnel accompanied the raid to insure due process was properly executed. The majority of those arrested in San Ramon were released to the mayor's custody thus, establishing a stronger case for legitimacy by allowing the mayor to resolve the arrests.

PERSEVERANCE

The elements of perseverance are:

1. Perseverance is the persistent pursuit of national goals and objectives for as long as necessary to achieve them.
2. Perseverance does not preclude taking decisive action.
3. It requires careful, informed analysis to select the right time and place for that action.

COMPLIANCE/ANALYSIS TO PERSEVERANCE IN "BLAST FURNACE"

"Blast Furnace" did not comply with the first aspect of perseverance. The duration did not meet the criteria for a protracted struggle, but it was not designed for prolonged operations. Its entire duration was four months; the original objective was to disrupt cocaine production in Bolivia for 60 days. It was an experiment to

determine the effectiveness of the military support in the counter-drug interdiction role. As a tactical operation, it proved to be one of the most effective to date. However, as a long term solution it would have been politically unacceptable. There is no definitive evidence that ties "Blast Furnace" to a master counter-drug strategy. The NSDD authorizing the operation was signed in April 1986. The Operation was executed in mid-July 1986; therefore, there was little time to prepare a well thought out strategy.

The operation met the second criteria of decisive action. It sent a strong signal to the drug production and trafficking community that the U.S. would not sit idly by while drugs sources continued to function with impunity. Estimates indicate that approximately 200 drug traffickers fled to Panama and an additional 600 to Paraguay during the operation.⁵⁵ The price of coca leaves also dropped from \$125 to \$15 in the local area which was \$20 to \$25 less than the cultivation cost.⁵⁶ The results indicated that the U.S. military was capable of conducting effective drug interdiction actions with little warning. The financial and political cost, however, made a permanent presence impossible.

The operation did not comply with the third aspect of perseverance which entails, after an informed analysis, the selection of the right time and place for action. The U.S. national leadership needed to make a statement through decisive action somewhere

⁵⁵"White Powder War," Soldiers, September 1987, p. 19.

⁵⁶Abbott, p. 102.

outside the U.S. and Bolivia provided the opportunity. According to the commander of Task Force Janus the national leadership picked Bolivia for the following reasons:

(1) The president of Bolivia felt he was losing control of his country to drug traffickers; (2) Bolivia was on the verge of being decertified by the U.S. government for failure to make any progress in drug eradication efforts; (3) traffickers in Columbia and Peru each had an organic military capability to counter the drug traffickers whereas Bolivia had neither the capability, the money, nor the know-how; and the terrorist threat in Bolivia was less than that in the other countries.⁵⁷

The informed analysis did not consider key factors. Bolivia was the right place if the reader views the effectiveness of "Blast Furnace" with regards to its ability to effectively interdict drugs. However, the selection of the right place must be tied to a greater strategy that considers more than just destroying labs. It must consider those political, economical and social factors that impact on the ability to conduct tactical operations. The impact of not considering these factors was exemplified by the violent reaction from the coca growers who saw the operation as an imposition on their livelihood and Bolivians citizens who perceived the employment of foreign troops on Bolivian soil as a violation of their sovereignty.

⁵⁷Abbott, p. 101.

COMPLIANCE/ANALYSIS OF PERSEVERANCE IN "SNOWCAP"

The San Ramon raid complied with the first aspect of perseverance. Unlike "Blast Furnace," the San Ramon raid was the tactical action within the greater ongoing strategy of Operation "Snowcap." The raid was one of the more successful in a series of tactical actions. The U.S. military personnel assisted in the planning San Ramon after successive failures.

The DEA had made two previous raid in 1989. These raids were in the town of Santa Ana which resulted in the DEA and UMOPAR being chased out of town by angry townspeople and resulted in four fatalities including one UMOPAR agent. The second raid was also a failure. Its intended target was the drug trafficker "Yayo" Rodriguez. The raid was rendered null because the Bolivian Army Colonel accompanying the DEA tipped off the drug traffickers of the impending raid.⁵⁸ The military planning team prepared the San Ramon raid along the lines of a military operation. Their efforts were instrumental in the success of the mission. In a conversation between Don Ferrone and U.S. Ambassador Gelbard, both agreed on the continuation of additional raids.

The San Ramon raid complied with the second elements of perseverance. The raid was a decisive action executed with vigor. It did not comply with the third. The raid was analyzed by the DEA for three months, but the complete U.S. planning team had only a week to prepare. The DEA also knew that the major drug traffickers such

⁵⁸"The Rat's nest"

as the Gacha family from Colombia and "Yayo" Rodriguez were aware of a raid in the general vicinity of San Ramon. The drug traffickers reacted by moving several allegedly stolen planes from San Ramon to avoid confiscation by the counter-drug forces. The DEA picked the right place, but not the right time for the action.

CHAPTER FIVE

CONCLUSIONS

The answer to the thesis question, "Are U.S. personnel in Bolivia employing the Low Intensity Conflict (LIC) imperatives in executing the Bolivia/U.S. Counter-Drug Strategy?" is a negative one. Of the five LIC imperatives, "Blast Furnace" complied with only adaptability. "Snowcap" complied with political dominance, adaptability, and legitimacy. It failed to comply with unity of effort and perseverance.

The criteria established that to comply with the imperatives as a whole, U.S. military personnel had to conform to both political dominance and legitimacy and two of the remaining three imperatives. These are unity of effort, adaptability, and perseverance. Neither of the two operations complied with the criteria requirements. The general trend, however, is moving toward compliance. Compliance from "Blast Furnace" to "Snowcap" went from one to three imperatives.

"Blast Furnace" complied only with adaptability. The U.S. Military personnel modified their intelligence, logistics, and aviation doctrine to support the needs of the mission. They applied lessons

learned from the successes and failures to improve their effectiveness. For example, they changed targets from the coca growers to the cocaine base/cocaine hydrochloride labs. The labs were at center of the production and transportation process. The personnel were also noteworthy in their ability to adapt quickly.

The Operation's failure to comply with political dominance was based on massive political opposition. Most Bolivians and Latin American citizens, in general, opposed the introduction of U.S. combat troops. They did not distinguish between the direct and support roles. To them, military involvement constituted a violation of their sovereignty.

Task Force "Janus" began operations two weeks after receiving initial notification. It did not comply with unity of effort because there was little time for integration between the host country and U.S. counter-drug forces until they were in Bolivia. The Task Force's 30 day rotation policy also made integration difficult. Perseverance could not be adequately measured because of the operation's short duration. It was also not well tied to a higher, bilateral political strategy. The operation was an experiment to measure the effectiveness of military forces in a counter-drug role. Compliance with legitimacy was also negative. As with political dominance, significant numbers of Bolivians opposed their government's policy of allowing U.S. combat military units to operate within their country. They perceived foreign military involvement as the use of an inappropriate use force by their own government.

Without consideration of the political fallout, the operation accomplished its mission very effectively. It shut down cocaine production by 90% for four months. Drug traffickers fled the country and the cost of coca leaf dropped below the level of the cost to cultivate it. Therefore, from a strictly tactical perspective the operation was a success. However, the confrontations in LIC are not resolved strictly at the tactical level.

Compliance with the LIC imperatives in "Snowcap's" San Ramon raid were an improvement to "Blast Furnace". The San Ramon raid was one in a series of counter-drug police actions under Operation "Snowcap". It provided a representative sample of "Snowcap" strategy which is directed at drug traffickers and labs instead of coca farmers. The San Ramon raid was the first time since "Blast Furnace" that military planners had been used in preparing a raid. Special Forces personnel, however, had been providing training to the Bolivian counter-drug forces since 1987. The contributions of the military planners were instrumental in the increased efficiency of the operation.

The San Ramon raid complied with the two key imperatives. It complied with political dominance by applying the lesson learned from raids and "Blast Furnace." It did not have the high profile U.S. military presence; therefore, the public outcry was minimal. Legitimacy was accomplished by following the due process of Bolivian law and the UMOPAR were responsible for making the arrest in the execution of their police duties. The U.S. military

compliance with adaptability was also accomplished. The team was assembled specifically for the mission.

The raid not comply with unity of effort. The U.S. counter-drug personnel did not inform their Bolivian counterparts on target location until they were en route. This indicated unfavorable integration between the host country and U.S. personnel. The raid also did not comply with a key element that stipulates choosing the right time to act. The DEA chief in La Paz knew that the important drug traffickers were aware that a raid in the vicinity of San Ramon was imminent. Perhaps because the confidential informers who are often paid by the DEA were also "double dipping" from the drug traffickers who may have paid to stay informed.

The two operations provide examples of performance in the counter-drug effort. There were improvements between operations. A change in strategy from attacking the growers to attacking the producers and traffickers eliminated some of the animosity toward U.S. military forces; however, the success in accomplishing the mission has also diminished. The challenge is to provide the effectiveness of "Blast Furnace" with the political correctness of the San Ramon raid over an extended period of time.

The issue of proper resources to attack the problem is also a serious one. The San Ramon raid used 9 UH-1 helicopters and 3 C-130 aircraft and cost of the raid was more than \$100,000. At this level of cost the raids may become financially prohibitive. The coca growing and processing area is approximately the size of Texas. Nine

UH-1 helicopters will have a difficult time patrolling the area and conducting raids on the several hundred labs in the area.

The challenge may be too difficult and overwhelming unless we address some of the underlying problems that plague Bolivia. A few that impact severely on the implementation of an effective drug strategy are poverty, corruption, and political instability. They are interrelated and difficult to address separately.

Bolivia is one of the poorest nations in Latin America. It is heavily reliant on the cocaine trade which provides the country with approximately one fifth of its gross national product. The country currently earns more through the export of cocaine than any other legal export. Approximately 300,000 campesinos are involved in the cultivation of coca alone according to U.S congressional sources in 1991. The per capita income is approximately \$600. Offers of U.S. aid for development are considerably less.

It is difficult to believe that the Bolivian people will be willing to give up their greatest source of income without something to replace it on an equal basis. Often, cooperation in the drug effort has been through threats of losing U.S. financial aid. The Bolivian government will most likely do what is needed to placate the U.S. The eradication effort will continue, and the coca growers will continue to move their coca fields to new areas. Yet, it is highly unlikely that they will destroy the source of their livelihood.

The poverty that Bolivia faces also breeds corruption at every level of government. Corruption destroys the foundation of any of the LIC imperatives. A prominent example is the lack of operational

security in conducting raids. Bolivian personnel at all levels provide early warning to the target. It only takes a few strategically placed informants to render an operation null. If the targets are only coca fields or labs that do not result in arrest of those who operate them or pay to run them the interdiction effort will never stop. Drug traffickers are willing to give up labs as a part of conducting business. The Bolivian newspapers and history books are full of examples of well placed corrupt politicians who were more than willing to work for drug traffickers.

Political instability is another one Bolivia's trademarks. The country has had 200 coups since its independence in 1825 and has functioned under 17 constitutions. Rule by decree is common. This instability is made even more severe by the drug trade. The trade has a profound impact on the government. The instability makes any cooperative counter-drug effort next to impossible since the institutions competing for political power are often in an adversarial relationship. These are sometimes the same agencies that we must coordinate with for unity of effort. An example is the Bolivian military and police who since the 1940's have resolved three of their disputes in armed conflict. The latest was in 1964.

The definition of LIC states: "It is waged by a combination of means, employing political, economic, informational, and military instruments." The challenges will be great to member of an organization that conduct its routine mission in the most direct manner possible. Successful action will be the the result of

compromise and negotiations. Traits not normally associated with military operations.

The results of the study indicate that there is a direct correlation between compliance with the LIC imperatives and success in LIC operations. Congressional reports and SOUTHCOM assessments indicate that little progress has been made in Bolivia to stem the flow of drugs. The success in interdiction in the area has been attributed Colombia and its interdiction efforts. The current street price of cocaine which is a good indicator of supply suggests that the flow has not been disrupted.

A recommended study effort would be to analyze the impact of corruption on counter-drug forces. The study could use, as a setting, one or any of three cocaine producing countries in the Andean Ridge. It could address the root causes of corruption and determine how U.S. counter-drug forces minimize their impact on the host country agencies.

APPENDIX

LITERATURE REVIEW

The literature search began with a background study of the threat drugs pose to U.S. society and the actions that led to the use of our military forces in the counter-drug mission. Personal interest was fueled by the fact that the military was involved in this less than traditional mission. The manual Campaign Planning and the Drug War by Murl D. Munger and William W. Mendel provided a excellent source of background information on understanding the drug problem and the key players in the interdiction effort. Magazine and newspaper articles provided an understanding of the increased military involvement.

The search included a review of the drug strategies from the national level to the USMILGP in Bolivia. The foundation for drug control strategy started with the Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1988. It presented drugs as one of the great menaces to our society. It was also more commonly recognized as the document that created the office of the "Drug Czar." The Act, was the basis for the the National Drug Control Strategies. The White House wrote the first National Drug Control Strategy in September 1989. They are updated annually and each successive volume was modified based on the

successes or failures of the previous volume. The most current was dated February 1991. It provided direction to all federal agencies involved in the counter drug effort.

The National Security Strategy of the United States incorporated the elimination of drugs as one of its political agenda for the 1990's. The thesis referenced the August 1991 version which described a more active role in the reduction and eventual elimination of illicit drugs in the U.S. These goals and objectives were more clearly articulated in the previously mentioned National Drug Control Strategy.

Military involvement in the counter-drug mission became more extensive on 18 September 1989 when the Secretary of Defense issued "The Department of Defense Guidance for Implementation of the President's National Drug Control Strategy" memorandum. The same day he issued memorandums to the unified and specified combatant commands to elevate the mission priority of counter-drug operations and specifically directed the Commander-in-Chief South (CINCSOUTH) to prepare a counter-drug plan in conjunction with cooperating host nations. From the Secretary's guidance the CINCSOUTH prepared the Andean Ridge campaign plan which addressed Colombia, Peru, Ecuador, and Bolivia. Within each country, the commander of each U.S. Military Group (MILGP), the CINC's representative in country, developed a plan for specific military actions to support the ambassador.

The 15 February 1991 Document of Cartagena was another key document to the thesis. It specified the agreed to actions the

presidents of the U.S, Colombia, Peru, and Bolivia deemed necessary to eliminate illicit drug traffic. The Document provided the basis for State Department and specifically the Bolivia/U.S. Country Team Counter Drug Strategy.

The "school of thought" associated with the readings on drug strategy indicated that the U.S. government intended to attack the supply and demand side of the problem. This thesis focused on the supply side in Bolivia to affect interdiction objectives. The initial Bolivia/U.S. strategy emphasized the eradication of illicit coca fields. The strategy changed to targeting the coca processing labs after numerous demonstrations by coca farmer and labor groups protesting against their loss of livelihood for coca revenues.

The RAND corporation study entitled "Sealing the Borders: The Effects of Increased Military Participation in Drug Interdiction" provided some findings which argue that major increased military interdiction is unlikely to significantly reduce drug consumption in the U.S. The view that interdiction is ineffective seems to be reiterated in most of the newspaper and magazine on the subject. Don Ferrone, the DEA chief station in Bolivia, in a television interview, argued that to effectively deal with the drug problem in Bolivia the program will require substantially more money.

To understand the environment, the thesis included a Bolivia country study and some basic information on cocaine. The country study was based primarily on the Historia Grafica de Bolivia by Mariano Baptista Gumucio, the area handbook series: Bolivia: a Country Study, the Defense and Area Handbook, and the February

1966 and April 1987 issues of National Geographic. The area study provided an overview of the history, geography, government, society, and the economy. The January 1989 National Geographic and the 30 November 1989 Insight article "How America Lost Its First Drug War" provided the overview on cocaine.

The foundation for the thesis is the analysis in Chapter Three. It focused on four key variables which were represented by supporting documents. These were first, the LIC imperatives as defined in Field Manual 100-20/Air Force Pamphlet 3-20. Military Operations in a Low Intensity Conflict. dated 5 December 1990. Second, the background study of Bolivia was found in history books and area studies as stated earlier in the literature search. Third, the Bolivia/U.S. Drug Control Strategy was articulated in the counter-drug objectives in the USMILGP-Bolivia 1991 Country Briefing which was based on national level strategies. The fourth were the actions of the U.S. military in Bolivia during Operations "Blast Furnace and "Snowcap". These actions were described by Michael Abbott's article "The Army and the Drug War: Politics or National Security?", John T. Fishel's article "Toward an Effective Drug War Strategy: Lessons Learned From Operation "Blast Furnace", and the 324th Support Group's "Operation Blast Furnace After Action Report". The actions for Operation "Snowcap" were described in the Thirteenth Report by the Committee on Government Operations entitled "Stopping the Flow of Cocaine with Operation Snowcap: Is it Working?" Additional information on U.S. military actions was also provided in magazine and newspaper articles.

GLOSSARY

Area of Operations: That portion of an area of conflict necessary for military operations. Areas of operation are geographical areas assigned to commanders for which they have responsibility and in which they have authority to conduct military operations. (FM 101-5-1)

Civil Affairs (CA): Those phases of activities of a commander which embrace the relationship between the military forces and civil authorities and people in a friendly country or area or occupied country or area when military forces are present. Also called CA. (JCS Pub 1-02)

Country Team: The executive committee of an embassy, headed by the chief of mission, and consisting of the principal representatives of the government departments and agencies present (for example, the Department of State, Defense, Treasury, Commerce, and the USIA, USAID, DEA, and CIA). (FM 100-20/AFP 3-20)

Department of Defense: Department responsible for providing the military forces needed to deter war and protect the security of the country. Under the president, who is also the Commander-in-Chief, the Secretary of Defense exercises direction, authority,

and control over the Department, which includes the separately organized military departments of the Army, Navy, and Air Force, the Joint Chiefs of Staff providing military advice, the unified and specified combatant commands, and various defense agencies established for specific purposes. (U.S. Government Manual)

Department of Justice: As the largest law firm in the Nation, the Department of Justice serves as counsel for its citizens. It represents them in enforcing the law in the public interest. Through its thousands of lawyers, investigators, and agents, the Department plays a key role in protection against criminals and subversion, in ensuring healthy competition of business in our free enterprise system, and in enforcing drug, immigration, and naturalization laws. (U.S. Government Manual)

Department of State: The Department advises the president in the formulation and execution foreign policy. Its primary objective in the conduct of foreign relations is to promote the long-range security of and well being of the U.S. The Department determines and analyzes the facts relating to American overseas interests, makes recommendation on policy and future action and takes the necessary steps to carry out established policy. (U.S. Government Manual)

Department of Transportation: The Department establishes the Nation's overall transportation policy. Under its umbrella there are nine administrations whose jurisdictions include highway planning, development, and construction; urban mass transit;

railroads; aviation; and the safety of waterways, ports, highways, and oil and gas pipelines. (U.S. Government Manual)

Doctrine: Fundamental principles by which the military forces or elements thereof guide their actions in support of national objectives. It is authoritative but requires judgement in application. (JCS Pub 1-02)

Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA): The DEA is the lead Federal agency in enforcing narcotics and controlled substances laws and regulations. The administration's priority mission is the long-term mobilization of major trafficking organizations through the removal of the leaders and assets upon which these organizations depend. (U.S. Government Manual)

Drug Interdiction: Military or police action to prevent trafficking in illegal drugs; includes intelligence, surveillance, border patrol, inspections, raids, and other operations. (FM 100-20/AFP 3-20)

Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI): The FBI is the principal investigative arm of the U.S. Department of Justice. It is charged with gathering and reporting facts, locating witnesses, and compiling evidence in cases involving Federal jurisdiction. On 28 January 1982, the Attorney General assigned concurrent jurisdiction for the enforcement of the Controlled Substances Act to the Bureau and the DEA. (U.S. Government Manual)

Host Country: A nation in which representatives or organizations of another state are present because of government invitation and/or international agreement. (JCS Pub 1-02)

Insurgency: An organized movement aimed at the overthrow of a constituted government through the use of subversion and armed conflict. (JCS Pub 1-02)

Intelligence: The product resulting from the collection, processing, integration, analysis, evaluation and interpretation of available information concerning foreign countries or areas. (JCS-Pub 1-02)

Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield (IPB): A systematic approach to analyzing the enemy, weather, and terrain in a specific geographic area. It integrates enemy doctrine with the weather and terrain as they relate to the mission and the specific battlefield environment. This is done to determine and evaluate enemy capabilities, vulnerabilities, and probable courses of action. (FM 105-5-1)

International Narcotics Matters (INM): The Bureau of International Narcotics Matters is responsible for developing, coordinating, and implementing international narcotics control assistance activities of the Department of State. The Bureau provides guidance on narcotics control matters to the Chiefs of Missions and directs narcotics control coordinators at posts abroad; communicates or authorizes communication, as appropriate with foreign governments, on drug control matters including negotiating, concluding and terminating agreements relating to drug control matters. (U.S. Government Manual)

Joint Operation: An operation carried on by two or more of the armed forces of the U.S. (FM 101-5-1)

Low Intensity Conflict (LIC): Political-military confrontation between contending states or groups below conventional war and above the routine peaceful competition among states. It frequently involves protracted struggles of competing principles and ideologies. Low intensity conflict ranges from subversion to the use of armed force. It is waged by a combination of means, employing political, economic, informational, and military instruments. Low intensity conflicts are often localized, generally in the Third World, but contain certain regional and global security implications. Also called LIC. (JCS Pub 1-02)

Military Group (MILGP): A joint service group, normally under the military command of a commander of a unified command and representing the secretary of defense, which primarily administers the U.S. military assistance planning and programming in host country. (JCS Pub 1-02) Also known as Office of Defense Cooperation (ODC) or Security Assistance Office (SOA).

Narcotics Assistance Unit (NAU): The Unit, subordinate to the INM, provides logistical support to U.S. and host country counter-drug elements.

Players: Participants or active parties in a conflict. (FM 100-20/AFP 3-20)

Precursor Chemicals: Chemicals used in the processing of the coca to cocaine hydrochloride.

Psychological Operations (PSYOP): Planned operations to convey selected information and indicators to foreign audiences to

influence their emotions, motives, objective reasoning, and ultimately the behavior of foreign government, organizations, groups, and individuals. The purpose of psychological operations is to induce or reinforce attitudes and behavior favorable to the originator's objectives. Also called PSYOP. (JCS Pub 1-02)

Raid: An operation, usually small scale, involving a swift penetration of hostile territory to secure information, confuse the enemy, or to destroy his installations. It ends with a planned withdrawal on completion of the assigned mission. (JCS Pub 1-02)

U.S. Coast Guard: The Coast Guard is a branch of the Armed Services of the U.S. at all times and is a service within the Department of Transportation except when operating as part of the Navy in time of war or when the president directs. Among its many missions, the Coast Guard works with other Federal agencies in the enforcement of such laws as they pertain to the protection of living and nonliving resources and in the suppression of smuggling and illicit drug trafficking. (U.S. Government Manual)

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ADB167057, Sergio de la Pena, "Analysis of the Execution of Counter-Drug Strategy in Bolivia Using the Low Intensity Conflict Imperatives," dated 1992.

ADB135594, N. Wijbrandus, "Soviet Desant Operations and US Air Base Ground Defense," dated 1989.

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